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THE PROPOSALS FOR A SECURITIES
MARKET LAW FOR CANADA:
PURPOSE AND PROCESS
By PmLIP ANISMAN*
A little over two years ago, on November 28, 1979, the Minister of
Consumer and Corporate Affairs released the Proposalsfor a Securities Market Law for Canada,' the result of a study initiated in May 1973 to provide
a detailed analytic foundation upon which the Government of Canada might
formulate its policy for the regulation of the Canadian securities market. In
accordance with the study's design, the Minister emphasized that the Proposals
do not reflect government policy but rather contain the recommendations of
their authors. 2 The Proposalswere thus released as a discussion document to
invite comments from provincial governments, members of the investment
community and other interested persons so that the Government might develop
its position in light of both the Proposals and the reaction to them. 3
Although the reactions initially reported in the press were less than fao Copyright, 1982, Philip Anisman.
* Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. Professor Anisman

directed the "Securities Market Study" that resulted in the Proposals for a Securities
Market Law for Canadaand wrote the final version of the Draft Act and Commentary.
1

Anisman et al., Proposals for a Securities Market Law for Canada (3 vols.,

Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1979) (Vol. 1: Draft Act; Vol. 2: Com-

mentary; Vol. 3: Background Papers) [hereinafter 1 Proposals, 2 Proposals and 3
Proposalswithout cross reference]. The system of citation adopted by the Osgoode Hall
Law Journal uses only the name of the lead author when there is more than one. My

co-authors are Warren M.H. Grover, John L. Howard and J. Peter Williamson.

2
See Consumer and Corporate Affairs Canada, News Release: CCAC Minister
Releases Securities Market Study, November 28, 1979.
3 See 1 Proposals at vi (Preface).
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vourable, 4 the official organizations of the securities industry apparently concluded that the Proposals merit serious consideration and established a joint
industry committee to review them,5 academic commentators praised the qual-7
ity of the Proposals0 and recent provincial legislation reflects their influence.
Moreover, during the past year the current Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, reaffirming his intentions concerning the Proposals,requested
the views of provincial governments and other interested parties,8 and the
Prime Minister indicated his desire that the federal government have authority
over securities legislation, perhaps through a constitutional amendment. 9 Now
that Parliament has formally requested the patriation of the Canadian constiution with an amending formula, as well as a charter of rights,' 0 it is likely
that the federal government will turn its attention to the allocation of legislative powers between Parliament and the provincial legislatures,"1 especially
as a constitutional conference of first ministers must be convened within a
year after the ConstitutionAct, 1981 comes into force. 12 A symposium issue

on the Proposalsis therefore timely and provides an occasion to outline their
genesis and substance and to consider the continued viability of their underlying premises in view of events since their publication.
As in other federal jurisdictions, securities legislation was first enacted in
4 See, e.g., Stephens, "Protest federal securities plan: Why tamper with system that
works, industry asks", Toronto Star, Nov. 29, 1979 at E9, col. 3. The response to the
Proposalsis discussed more fully in the text accompanying notes 99-111, infra.
5 The committee is called the "Joint Industry Committee on a Securities Market
Law for Canada"; see Toronto Stock Exchange, Members' Manual (1980) at A-7.
6See, e.g., Johnston, Book Review (1981), 26 McGill L.J. 626; Simmonds, Proposals for a Securities Market Law for Canada: A Review (1981), 3 J. Comp. Corp.
L. and Sec. Reg. 31 at 43.
7 See, e.g., Quebec Securities Commission, New Quebec Securities Act: Working
Paper (1980). See also text accompanying notes 123-30, infra.
8 See Ouellet, Notes for Remarks to a Joint Meeting of the Ontario and Quebec
Business Law Sections of the Canadian Bar Association, February 15, 1981 at 8.
9 See "Doesn't foresee unilateral move, Trudeau states", The Globe and Mail (Toronto), Feb. 21, 1981 at 1, col. 5.
10 See Resolution respecting the Constitution of Canada, adopted by the House of
Commons on December 2, 1981. Schedule B of the Canada Act, requested in the
Resolution, constitutes the proposed Constitution Act, 1981, Part I of which contains a
"Canada Charter of Rights and Freedoms" and Part V a "Procedure for Amending [the]
Constitution of Canada."
"1See, e.g., Trudeau, A Time for Action: Toward the Renewal of the Canadian
Federation (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1978) at 25 (first phase of constitutional reform to deal with matters within Parliament's exclusive competence and
the second phase primarily with the distribution of legislative powers). See also Chrdtien,
Securing the Canadian Economic Union in the Constitution (Ottawa: Minister of Supply
and Services, 1980) at 29-33.
12 Constitution Act, 1981, Resolution respecting the Constitution of Canada, supra
note 10, sched. B, s. 37. Although subsection 37(1) in terms requires a conference within a year after "this Part comes into force" and section 37 is the only one in Part IV,
the Act does not appear to contemplate a partial proclamation that would omit Part IV
and thus delay a constitutional conference, for section 58 expressly excepts one paragraph of the Act from its general authorization to proclaim the Act in force. Cf., however, In re a Reference Concerning the Proclamation of Section 16 of the Criminal Law
Amendment Act, 1968-69, [1970] S.C.R. 777, 10 D.L.R. (3d) 699, [1970] 3 C.C.C. 320.
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any federal corporation that wished to sell its securities to the public,' no
attempt was made by the federal government to enter the field, in part, perhaps, because of the Privy Council's restrictive interpretations of Parliament's
legislative jurisdiction over matters involving business relations.' 5 Whatever
the reason, during the succeeding decades, even though there was some dissatisfaction expressed over the inconvenience and cost resulting from a lack of
uniformity in the various provinces, local administration of legislation designed
to prevent fraudulent sales of securities was generally accepted as preferable
to a centralized federal scheme. 1' By 1964, however, a desire for uniform
securities laws with "high standards of disclosure, competence and ethics"
and an antipathy toward unnecessary duplication under the existing provincial
legislation led the Royal Commission on Banking and Finance to recommend
the creation of a federal regulatory agency to clear interprovincial and interand to enforce the securities fraud provinational distributions of securities
17
Code.
Criminal
the
in
sions

The Royal Commission Report initiated a period, which is still continuing, of active and constant reconsideration and reform of securities laws
in Canada. Within a year the Kimber Committee, appointed by the Attorney
General of Ontario in 1963, recommended introduction of a new securities
act with a number of innovations, similar to the prescriptions of the Porter
Commission, intended to increase investor confidence and the efficiency of
13The first statute was enacted in Manitoba; see Sale of Shares Act, S.M. 1912,
c. 75; see also Sale of Shares Act, S.S. 1914, c. 18. The history of Canadian securities
regulation is discussed in Williamson, Securities Regulation in Canada (Toronto: U. of
T. Press, 1960), c. 1; Supplement (Ottawa: Gov't of Canada, 1966), c. 1.
14 Can., Report of the Royal Commission on Price Spreads (Kennedy Report)
(Ottawa: King's Printer, 1935) at 44. The Securities Board was to operate as a division
of a Federal Trade and Industry Commission; id. at 44, 265 and 274.
15 See, e.g., Anisman and Hogg, "Constitutional Aspects of Federal Securities Legislation" in 3 Proposals 135 at 157-58; Williamson, supra note 13, at 18. In contrast the
United States Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a, ff. and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, ff., the foundation statutes for
federal regulation of the securities market in the United States. For the history of
securities legislation in that country, see Loss, 1 Securities Regulation (2d ed. Boston:
Little, Brown, 1961; Supp. 1969), c. 1.
10 See, e.g., Can., 2 Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion-ProvincialRelations (Rowell-Sirois Report) (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1940) at 57-58. In fact the senior
official responsible for the administration of federal company law so testified; id. at 57.
See also Richardson, Company Law: 1923-1947 (1948), 26 Can. B. Rev. 183 at 194-96.
Compare Mulvey, Blue Sky Law (1916), 36 Can. L.T. 37 (Toronto Globe of June 16,
1916 demanded that federal government consider enactment of securities legislation).
17 See Can., Report of the Royal Commission on Banking and Finance (Porter
Report) (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1964) at 348-49; see also Criminal Code, R.S.C.
1970, c. C-34, ss. 338-342. While the Commission emphasized the importance of uniformity, it also recognized the national scope of the Canadian securities market and
the increasing international aspects of securities trading and of fraudulent schemes; see
id.; and see 2 Proposalsat 1-4.
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the securities market by "raising the standards governing the industry."' The
Committee's recommendations were quickly introduced and, after some consultation with the other provincial officials, were enacted as the Ontario Securities Act, 1966.19 In the same year the effects of the Porter Report were
seen at the federal level; the Commission's recommendation, with an assist
from the Canadian Bar Association, had directed the attention of the federal
government to the securities market and resulted in the creation of a "Securities Task Force" under Marc Lalonde, then in private law practice in Montreal, with Professor J.Peter Williamson as director of research. 21 The Task
Force prepared a comprehensive survey of the current state of Canadian securities regulation, including an analysis of the new Ontario Act,2 and a number of papers on specific topics such as criminal law and securities markets,
mutual funds, and self-regulation as background for a federal-provincial conference of administrators held in November 1966.23 The work of the Task
Force was completed the following summer in the newly created Department
of Consumer and Corporate Affairs under the direction of Professor William-

18 Ont., Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Securities Legislation in
Ontario (Kimber Report) (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1964) at para. 1.17. The Report
recommended revision of the distribution process and of prospectus disclosure, and the
enactment of provisions governing insider trading and reporting, takeover bids, proxy
solicitation and interim financial disclosure by issuers; compare the Porter Report, supra
note 17, at 349-52.
19 Securities Act, 1966, S.O. 1966, c. 142; see also Bray, Ontario's Proposed Securities Act: An Overview, Its Purpose and Policy Premises, [1975] O.S.C. Bull. 235 at 24344 (October).
20 Canadian Bar Association, Aide Memoire: Re Canadian Securities Legislation
and Administration (Ottawa: April 1966).
21 Professor Williamson was the author of the then leading text on Canadian securities regulation, supra note 13, and had written on the question of federal regulation; see
Williamson, Securities Regulation: A Review of Some Current Problems (1962), 27
Bus. Q. 31 (Fall).
22
See Williamson, Securities Regulation in Canada:Supplement, supra note 13, at i.
23 A joint federal-provincial study of mutual funds previously approved at a meeting
of first ministers in August 1966 was implemented at the November meeting; see Can.,
Report of the Canadian Committee on Mutual Funds and Investment Contracts (Ottawa:
Queen's Printer, 1969) at iii.
The provincial administrators were in favour of the development of a "securities
fraud squad" and a central information centre concerning securities fraud by the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police. The securities unit is now a part of the R.C.M.P. Commercial Crime Branch; see, e.g., Moon, "Canada's top criminals move into big-time
fraud", The Globe and Mail (Toronto), Apr. 2, 1975 at 3, col. 5; see also Hebenton
and Gibson, "International Aspects of Securities Legislation," in 3 Proposals 1139 at
1217-19; and see 1 Proposals,s. 11.13; 2 Proposalsat 212-14 (R.C.M.P. computer system to include information on lost and stolen Canadian securities).
The conference of administrators agreed on the need for amendment of the wash
trading provision in the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 340, and for a new
section prohibiting certain fraudulent representations; see 2 Proposals at 227. The recommended amendment was included in the omnibus amendments introduced in 1978;
see Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1978, Bill C-51, 1978 (30th Parl. 3d Sess.), cl.46
(adding new section 340.1 which would have reversed the onus of proof). Although
the bill did not pass, it is expected to be reintroduced in the near future with both of
the recommended provisions.
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son 24 and a second conference of administrators was held in the fall of 1967
to consider possible mechanisms for federal-provincial co-operation in light
of the "Cansec" proposal circulated by the Ontario Securities Commission
earlier that year. 26 The "Federal-Provincial Committee of Officials on Financial Institutions and Securities
Regulation" met again in October 1968, ap26
parently for the last time.
Although a federal commission was discussed at the meeting of officials
in 1968 and draft federal legislation prepared, no bill was introduced in Parliament and no concrete proposal was published. Nevertheless, the possibility
of a federal agency continued to receive attention, 27 encouraged by periodic
intimations of federal interest in a role in the regulation of the Canadian market28 and by the occasional speeches of successive ministers of the Department
of Consumer and Corporate Affairs asserting the need for federal regulation. 29
The provinces, however, during this period made substantial progress toward
uniformity. By 1969 the Ontario Act of 1966 had been adopted with minor
modification in Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba and Saskatchewan and
a few years later Quebec brought its act substantially into line m In 1971 a
series of national policy statements applicable across the country3' and another series of uniform act policies applicable in the five western provinces
24The second phase of the Securities Task Force involved preparation of further
studies including the compilation of data on distributions in Canada during the preceding
one and one half years.
25 See Cansec: Legal and Administrative Concepts, [1967] O.S.C. Bull. 61 (November); Langford & Johnston, The Case for a National Securities Commission, [1968] U.
Toronto Comm. J. 21. The Ontario proposal was premised on the inability of the
provincial commissions to deal adequately with problems in the securities market that
extend beyond their borders and recommended the creation of a Canadian Securities
and Exchange Commission on a co-operative basis involving the provinces and the
federal government. The co-operative commission was to have its executive offices in
Toronto and be responsible to a council of ministers. The proposal was not acceptable
to the federal government or to some provinces; see, e.g., Solomon, "Ottawa plans
dominant securities-policing role", The Financial Post, Nov. 2, 1968 at 3, col. 1. The
Cansec proposal and the reaction to it are discussed in Howard, "Securities Regulation:
Structure and Process," in 3 Proposals 1607 at 1689-97.
26 See Can. H. of C. Deb. (Nov. 16, 1970) at 1205.
27 See, e.g., Lutsky, "Ottawa's plans for securities could spark joint resistance",
The Globe and Mail (Toronto), Feb. 21, 1969 at B1, col. 6.
28 See, e.g., Solomon, "Phillips to investigate federal securities role", The Financial
Post, November 7, 1970 at 16, col. 4 (Senator Phillips retained to advise on federal
agency).
29
See, e.g., Basford, Notes for a Speech to the Annual Meeting of the Vancouver
Stock Exchange (January 28, 1971); Baxter, "National securities plan is mooted-but
no one cheers", The Financial Post, Sept. 23, 1972 at 1, col. 2 (speech delivered
in Quebec City to annual meeting of North American Association of Securities Administrators by Marc Lalonde on behalf of Minister, Robert Andras).
30
See Anisman, Takeover Bid Legislation in Canada: A Comparative Analysis
(Toronto: CCH Canadian, 1974) at 5-7. Nevertheless, major amendments were made to
the Ontario Act in 1971 and to Alberta's and Manitoba's in the following year; see id.
at 6n. 30.
543' See now National Policy Statements Nos. 1-33, 2 CCH Can. See. L. Rep.
838 - 54-869b. National Policy No. 1 deals with "Clearance of National Issues".
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with "uniform acts" 2 were initiated by the provincial commissions in an attempt to avoid unnecessary delays in processing prospectuses and to ensure
consistency of administrative interpretation. Moreover, Ontario embarked on
a complete revision of its securities act based upon the recommendations in a
report prepared by the Ontario Commission in 1970.83 On June 1, 1972 The
Securities Act, 1972,84 was introduced in the Ontario Legislature to invite
comment in the hope that it would provide the basis for a new uniform provincial act to be "adopted by almost all jurisdictions across Canada." 35
By 1973 the studies prepared by the Securities Task Force were largely
out of date. More importantly, developments in the securities market indicated
that reconsideration of the federal position and redefinition of the government's proposed regulatory role were necessary. The initial approach of the
federal government, which was premised on a desire for uniformity and avoidance of duplication in the clearing of prospectuses for national distributions
of securities, had been directed at the primary market, with secondary trading,
including supervision of stock exchanges, to be left to provincial regulation.
The provinces had, however, made a serious 36effort toward uniformity in this
area through the adoption of national policies.
Nevertheless, if the dimensions of the primary market were national, as
had been acknowledged implicitly in the national policies and explicitly in
the Cansee proposal,37 then the secondary market was necessarily so, for its
efficient functioning was, and is, a prerequisite for the effectiveness of the
S2 See now Uniform Act Policies Nos. 2-01 - 2-13, 2 CCH Can. Sec. L. Rep.
54-871 - 54-883.
33
See O.S.C., Report of the Committee of the Ontario Securities Commission on
the Problems of Disclosure Raised for Investors by Business Combinations and Private
Placements (Toronto: O.S.C., 1970) [hereinafter O.S.C. Disclosure Report]. A number
of the Report's technical recommendations, including those concerning takeover bids,
were enacted in 1971; see The Securities Amendment Act, 1971, S.O. 1971, c. 31; and
see supra note 30.
84 The Securities Act, 1972, Bill 154, 1972 (29th Leg. Ont., 2d sess.). The Bill was
the first of six, ultimately resulting in the enactment of the Securities Act, 1978, S.O.
1978, c. 47; see 2 Proposalsat xv. See now Securities Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 466 [hereinafter OntarioSecuritiesAct].
36 Notice: Statement by the Honourable Eric A. Winkler, Minister of Consumer
and Commercial Relations, on Introduction of the Securities Act, 1972, for First Reading, June 1st, 1972, [1972] O.S.C. Bull. 94 at 96 (June).
Securities legislation in Canada has since 1928 generally followed models developed
in Ontario; see, e.g., Williamson, supra note 13, at 28. See also Walker, Address to the
Toronto Society of Financial Analysts (Toronto: January 14, 1982) at 6, reproduced
in 3 0.S.C. Bull. 30A at 36A (January 15, 1982) ("Ontario has a leadership role on
securities regulation"). But see text accompanying notes 123-30 and 178-93, infra.
36 See supra notes 31 and 32. By the end of 1972 the Commissions had adopted
twenty-seven national policy statements and twelve uniform act policies. The effectiveness of the commissions' attempt to streamline prospectus clearances was not, however,
unquestioned; see, e.g., Lockwood, "Procedures in Cross-Country Prospectus Clearance
and Regulation by Policy Statement," in Law Society of Upper Canada Special Lectures:
Corporate and Securities Law (Toronto: De Boo, 1972) 111 at 114-16.
37 See supranote 25.
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primary market's operationS 8 Moreover, it was apparent that the trading market was developing in a manner that necessitated co-ordination of and federal
involvement in its regulation.3 9 New techniques of automation created the
possibility of a national automated trading market which would replace the
trading floors of the various Canadian stock exchanges. A project to consider the potential for such a system had been initiated by the Toronto Stock
Exchange as early as 1969; 41 in 1973 the Exchange approved a pilot opera42
tion to develop a computer assisted trading system on its own computers;
and in the same year the Montreal Stock Exchange circulated a proposal for
a Canada-wide securities market system premised on automated trading. 43
The fact that the major Canadian exchanges and other self-regulatory bodies
had co-operated in the formation of a Canadian depository for securities which
was in the process of developing a book-based automated settlement and
transfer system for securities trading 4 made a fully automated Canada-wide
trading and clearing system, possibly connected to exchanges elsewhere, seem
more likely. Finally, a number of scandals relating especially to offshore
mutual funds demonstrated that securities markets were becoming increasingly
international. 45
It was clear, therefore, that further study was necessary to enable the
federal government to determine its policy with respect to the Canadian securities market. In this context I joined the Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, in May 1973, as director of the Corporate Research Branch
to direct a study of the securities market designed to make recommendations

38 See, e.g., Williamson, "Canadian Capital Markets," in 3 Proposals 1 at 29-30
[hereinafter Williamson, "Capital Markets"]; see also Anisman and Hogg, supra note 15,
at 138.
39 The national character of the trading market was emphasized by the Ontario
Securities Commission in a decision proposing a co-operative study of stock exchange
commissions to develop a national rate structure; see In re Proposed Amendments to
Part XV of the By-Laws of the Toronto Stock Exchange, [1973] O.S.C. Bull. 107
(June).
40 The constitutional implications of such a development are discussed in Anisman
and Hogg, supra note 15, at 172.
41 See Cleland, "Applications of Automation in the Canadian Securities Industry:
Present and Projected," in 3 Proposals947 at 1023-27.
42
See id. at 1026-27. The acronym of the project is "CATS."
43
See id. at 1032-34. Both developments were encouraged by automated trading
systems being considered in the United States; see id. at 1020-24. See also Jenkins,
"Computer Communications Systems in Securities Markets," in 3 Proposals 1057 at
1072-98 for a description of the various systems.
44 See Cleland, supra note 41, at 1003-1005 (Canadian Depository for Securities);
see also Jenkins, supra note 43, at 1098-1101. Again, American parallels existed; see
Cleland at 1005-1008.
45
The most obvious example is I.O.S. Ltd., which adversely affected Canada's
image abroad; see, e.g., Baillie and Grover, 1 Proposals for a Canada Mutual Funds
Law (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1974) at 52 [hereinafter Mutual Fund Proposals];
cf. S.E.C. v. United Financial Group, Inc., 474 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1973); and see
Anisman and Hogg, supra note 15, at 141.
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on the federal government's regulatory role." Although the scope and details
of the study had not been defined, it was generally understood that the resulting recommendations were to be published as a policy report to the government containing the views of its authors. 47 The recommendations were to be
embodied in a draft statute in order to provide a concrete focus for the comments of interested persons and were to be accompanied by an explanatory
commentary outlining the substance of the scheme and the particular provisions, the reasons for their adoption and the alternatives considered. A similar
format, used by the American Law Institute in the United States for its model
codes4 8 and by Professor Gower when he drafted a companies code for
Ghana,49 had been adopted in the Proposalsfor a New Business Corporations
Law for Canada recently prepared for the Department. 0 As a result of the
success of the Business CorporationProposals,'1 similar sets of proposals on
non-profit corporations and mutual funds had been commissioned by the Corporate Research Branch 2 and their approach had also been followed in other
divisions of the Department.es
4
My predecessor as director of the Corporate Research Branch, John L. Howard,
one of the authors of the Proposalsfor a New Btsiness CorporationsLaw for Canada,
infra note 50, had himself intended to initiate a similar study prior to his promotion to
Assistant Deputy Minister for Corporate Affairs.
47 Some members of the Department expressed reservations about attribution of
authorship to public servants, but the traditional approach of anonymity of public servants did not prevail because a declaration of authorship would emphasize that the
report does not necessarily reflect government policy; and none of the authors desired
the protection of anonymity. In any event, by the time the Proposals were released,
none of the authors was a public servant; see Bloomfield, "Floor Talk: Securities administration is lively issue", The FinancialPost, Sept. 22, 1979 at 21, col. 1.
4
8 See, e.g., Model Penal Code, Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-13 (Philadelphia: A.L.I., 19531961); Proposed Official Draft (1962); and see now Model Penal Code and Comen.
taries, Part II (3 vols. 1980).
49
See Ghana, Final Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Working and
Administration of the Present Company Law of-Ghana (L.C.B. Gower, Commissioner)
(1961).
50
See Dickerson et al., Proposalsfor a New Business CorporationsLaw for Canada
(Ottawa: Information Canada, 1971) (2 vols.: vol. 1, Commentary; vol. 2, Draft
Canada Business Corporations Act) [hereinafter Business Corporation Proposals]. On
the format of these proposals see 1 Business CorporationProposals at iii.
51 See, e.g., Iacobucci, Shareholders Under the Draft Canada Business Corporations
Act (1973), 19 McGill L.J. 246 at 247 ("best Canadian attempt to deal realistically

and sensibly... with the corporation"). The Canada Business CorporationsAct, S.C.
1974-75, c. 33, was the immediate legislative result of the Business Corporation Proposals. The true measure of their success, however, has become apparent by the degree
to which they have encouraged uniformity of corporation law in Canada; see, e.g., 1
Proposals for a New Alberta Business CorporationsAct (Edmonton: Institute of Law
Research and Reform, Report No. 36, 1980) at 5-6; Barry, Proposals for a New
Company Law for Newfoundland (St. John's: Office of Legislative Council, 1978) at
1-3; see also, e.g., Business CorporationsAct, S.A. 1981, c. B-15; CorporationsAct,
S.M. 1976, c. 40 as am.; Business Corporations Act, S.N.B. 1981, c. B-9.1; Business
CorporationsAct, R.S.S. 1978, c. B-10 as am.; and see Business CorporationsAct, Bill
6, 1981 (32d Leg. Ont., 1st sess.).
5 See Cumming, Proposalsfor a New Not-For-ProfitCorporationsLaw for Canada
(2 vols.) (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1974); Mutual Fund Proposals, supra note 45.
53
See, e.g., Proposals for a New Competition Policy for Canada: First Stage
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The format of the Proposals was varied, however, by a decision, taken
at an early stage of the study, to publish any background papers prepared in
connection with it as a companion volume to the draft statute and commentary. 4 A number of reasons influenced this decision. Background papers analysing policy alternatives in light of current securities legislation and recent
market developments had to be prepared on each major aspect of securities
market regulation in order to provide a comprehensive overview of Canadian
securities regulation as a basis for the recommendations to be made in the
Proposals. As they would, in effect, constitute a current text on Canadian
securities regulation, it made no sense to permit them to remain in government
files once they had served their immediate purpose65 At the least, authors of
substantial research papers were entitled to have them published, 6 and the
prospect of publication with the Proposalsappeared likely both to encourage
people with expertise in the field, who were otherwise heavily committed, to
agree to work on the study and also to provide a healthy incentive with respect to the work itself. More importantly, a third volume containing the
papers would enable persons desiring to evaluate and comment on the Proposals to consider the background research on which they were based and
would thus further the principle of openness in government, one of the major
premises underlying the recommendations in the Proposalsand the conduct of
the Study itselff7 publication in this format would also require the authors of
the Proposals to explain any major divergence from the recommendations in
the background papers and would thus impose on them a discipline desirable
for such an exercise in law reform, to which the authors of the background
papers were in any event entitled.j 8 The result is, at least physically, the most
imposing volume of the Proposals.69
(Ottawa: Consumer and Corporate Affairs, 1973); Proposals for a New Competition
Policy for Canada: Second Stage (Ottawa: Consumer and Corporate Affairs Canada,
1977).
54 See 3 Proposalscontaining the fifteen background papers written for the Study.
This and other similar structural and budgetary decisions were approved through normal
departmental channels.
55 The papers prepared for the Securities Task Force, although intended for publication, had not been published. Nor were the background papers commissioned by the
"Corporations Task Force"; see 1 Business Corporation Proposals, supra note 50, at
iii-iv.
5 A term to that effect was included in each consultant's contract so that he might
publish his paper himself if the Department failed to do so. The Department's research
committee subsequently recommended that this approach be followed throughout the
Department.
57 See 1 Proposals,Part 15. See also text accompanying notes 69-72, infra; and see
Simmonds, Of Prospectuses and Closed Systems: An Analysis of Some Present and Pro-'
posed Legislation in Canada and the United States (1981), 19 Osgoode Hall L.J. 28.
58 See, e.g., 2 Proposals at 120-21 (small transaction exemption from insider reporting) and 382-83 (constitutional basis of draft Canada Securities Market Act).
59 See 3 Proposals which measures over three inches in thickness and contributes
substantially to the reported weight of the Proposals; see Bloomfield, "Floor Talk:
Ottawa treads on provinces' securities toes", The Financial Post, Dec. 8, 1979 at
25, col. 1 ("'10 pounds in al' says... Ontario's Minister"). See also Johnston, supra
note 6, at 635 ("remarkably comprehensive analysis of Canadian securities law and

policy").
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Although the various stages of the "Securities Market Study" are outlined
in the preface to the Proposals,0 a more detailed discussion of the study
process may provide a useful illustration of the organizational and methodological choices that are inevitable in any such effort in law reform. Soon after
joining the Department I prepared a detailed outline of the Study, including
a summary of each background paper that would be required. As publication
of the Mutual Fund ProposalsOawas imminent, the regulation of mutual funds
and other financial institutions was excluded from the Study's coverage except
in so far as consideration of their activities was necessary to a full analysis of
the functioning of the securities market. 1' Although temporal 62 and budgetary 8
constraints precluded a detailed empirical study of all aspects of the Canadian
securities market, or a cost-benefit analysis of all, or even the major, provisions
in existing securities legislation, the background papers were intended to provide a description and an assessment of the various laws from both a legal and
economic perspective. In particular, two papers were devoted to economic
aspects of the market and its regulation to ensure that existing economic
studies would be evaluated in light of current practices in the Canadian market4
so that they might be taken into account in the formulation of the Proposals.
And two papers on the implications of automation for the structure of the
securities market and the integrity of its operations were included for similar
reasons.as
From its inception the Securities Market Study was conducted in as open
a manner as possible. As the federal government had made known both its
interest in the securities market and the fact that the drafting of legislation had
been authorized, the Study was not viewed as a new matter for federal consideration but as a means of developing proposals that would provide a basis
for consultation with interested persons, including provincial governments,
and thus enable the federal government to determine its policy.10 As a result
the provinces were not formally consulted concerning initiation of the Study. 67
GOSee 1 Proposals at vi-vii.
coa Supranote 45.

61 Accordingly, to accurately reflect its scope, the study was called the "Securities
Market Study" rather than, as originally proposed, the "Capital Market Study."
62 The Study was initially, and unrealistically, to be completed in under three years.
It was initiated in May 1973 and completed almost six years later.
63 The cost of the Study, including consultants' fees, salaries of public servants
employed in the Corporate Research Branch and expenses involved in publication, was
approximately one and one half million dollars.
64 See Williamson, "Capital Markets", supra note 38; Williamson, "Canadian Financial Institutions," in 3 Proposalsat 719. A number of studies were undertaken internally
to collect available data on public distributions and private placements and on securities
trading in Canada; see, e.g., Williamson, "Capital Markets" at 63-66; Williamson,
"Canadian Financial Institutions" at 773-76. Data was also provided by several selfregulatory organizations in the securities industry; see I Proposals at ix.
65 See Cleland, supra note 41; Jenkins, supra note 43.
0
6 See supra, text following note 26 and accompanying notes 37-45.
67 See Report of the Western Premiers' Task Force on Constitutional Trends (1977)
at 22. The Western Premiers' Report commented on the lack of prior consultation concerning the Study and suggested that it should be reassessed in light of their concerns
about possible duplication and conflicts.
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Indeed, to have invited joint action at that time would have been presumptuous, for the provincial commissions were themselves engaged in active consideration of the recently introduced Ontario bill with a view to its adoption
across the country as a new uniform act. 8
The initiation of the Study, however, was publicly announced almost immediately by the Honourable Herb Gray, the Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs. 9 And although there was no formal consultation with the provincial governments, a substantial amount of informal discussion with provincial officials did occur. I discussed the purpose and details of the Study with
a number of provincial administrators informally at the annual meetings of the
North American Association of Securities Administrators and sent a copy of
the Study outline to any provincial administrator who expressed a desire to
see it. The Study outline was also given to officials of each of the Canadian
stock exchanges and of the Investment Dealers Association of Canada when
their co-operation was requested for the background papers69a Indeed, a summary of the outline found its way into the press. 7°
A similar openness to discussion was maintained throughout the course
of the Study. In 1974, during its organizational phase, I met with and described the Study to officials of the Ontario office of federal-provincial relations. In 1976 John Howard and I provided a progress report to a number of
provincial administrators, again on an informal basis, and the following year
John Howard attended a meeting of the provincial securities administrators to
discuss the Department's activities in areas relating to their interests including
the progress of the Study.71 Finally, at the annual May meeting of the provincial administrators in 1978, after the final meeting of the Study group,72 I
outlined the format and purpose of the Proposalsand the scheme that would
be contained in the final version and suggested a similar meeting to discuss
the substantive provisions of the Proposals after their completion so that the
experience of the provincial administrators might be brought to bear on them.
A copy of the penultimate draft of the Proposalswas, of course, sent to every
1s

See supra, notes 33-35 and accompanying text.

69 See Gray, "Why Gray wants national securities commission", The FinancialPost,

June 9, 1973 at 34, col. 3; see also Duncan, "Ottawa still pushing for federal securities
board", The Financial Post, May 26, 1973 at 14, col. 2.
69a See I Proposalsat ix.
70 The Proposals' format was also revealed in the press well in advance of publication; see Bloomfield, "Stock markets are acquiring a new Canadian identity", The Financial Post, Oct. 9, 1976 at 25, col. 2. However, not all of the press coverage was
favourable; see, e.g., "Patillo opposes regulation of securities by Ottawa", Financial
Times of Canada, Oct. 4, 1976 at 29, col. 4.
A list of the background papers and the names of the persons retained to prepare
them was also tabled in Parliament; see Can. H. of C. Deb. (June 7, 1977) at 6392.
71 The results of this meeting were reflected in the western premiers' second report;
see Western Premiers' Task Force on Constitutional Trends, Second Report (Victoria:
Ministry of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, 1978) at 12 (premiers awaiting publication of the Proposals);see also Western Premiers' Task Force on Constitutional Trends,
Third Report (Victoria: Ministry of Environment, 1979) at 15 (still awaiting publication; "this matter could be the subject of future constitutional review discussions").
7 See text accompanying notes 85-88, infra.
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administrator who requested one. Thus, the attitude adopted toward the provinces during the Study, in keeping with its ultimate purpose, was intended to
encourage an open and full discussion of the recommendations once they were
formulated and published as Proposals.
In the fall of 1973 and early 1974 consultants were retained to prepare
the background papers7" and a number of persons with special knowledge of
various aspects of the Study were invited to act as advisers, several of whom
were officials in other federal departments or agencies whose mandate related
to the securities market or the Study. 74 During this period efforts were also
made to ensure that the results of similar projects undertaken in the United
States and Australia would be available to the Study; Professor Louis Loss,
the reporter for the American Law Institute's project to codify the federal
securities laws, was early consulted with respect to the Study's design 76 and
with persons engaged in work on a federal securicorrespondence was initiated
76
ties act in Australia.
A first meeting of the consultants, advisers and departmental staff involved

73 During the course of the Study a few of the initial consultants withdrew because
of other commitments as is clear from the description of Professor Williamson's role
contained in the preface; see I Proposals at vii-viii. The consultants who prepared papers
are included in the list of advisers, id. at xii, and separately in the list of contributors
in 3 Proposals at 1717-20.
Preliminary discussions with the consultants were based on the outline of the Study
and on a draft outline of each paper to which a basic bibliography was appended. Once
the consultants were retained I served as a clearing house for current publications relating to their research and sent them either copies of or references to each new publication concerning it.
74 Some of the advisers also withdrew and were replaced. The list of advisers in the
Proposals includes those who attended the final meetings of the Study group. Advisers
came from the Capital Markets Division of the Department of Finance, the Federal
Provincial Relations Office, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Law Reform
Commission of Canada. Officials of the Bank of Canada, the Department of Justice and
the Economic Council of Canada, while not acting as advisers, were informed of the
progress of the Study and frequently provided helpful advice.
75 Professor Loss's contribution to the Study and the influence of his Code are
acknowledged in 1 Proposals at x. By May 1973 the first two tentative drafts of the
Federal Securities Code which cover the major substantive areas of the Study had been
published. The official draft was adopted in May 1978, about a month after the final
meeting of the Study group; see now Federal Securities Code (L. Loss, Reporter) (2
vols.) (Philadelphia: American Law Institute, 1980; 2d Supp. 1981) [hereinafter A.L.I.
FederalSecurities Code].
76
In 1974 a bill that would have created a federal commission was introduced in
the Australian Senate by Senator Murphy; see Corporationsand Securities Industry Bill
1974 (29th Part. Aust.); Corporations and Securities Industry Bill 1974: Explanatory
Memorandum (Aust. Senate 1974). Although a change in government prevented the
bill's enactment, the federal government and the states in December 1978 entered an
agreement to create a National Companies and Securities Commission. The agreement
is included as a schedule to the act creating the Commission; see National Companies
and Securities Commission Act, 1979, Aust. No. 173 (1979). The Commission began
operations in 1980. For a summary of its operations and policies see National Companies and Securities Commission, Second Annual Report (Canberra: Aust. Govt. Publishing Service, 1981).
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in the Study (the "Study group") was convened in early July 1974 to discuss
its scope and structure. 77 The consultants did not hesitate to raise basic issues.
A few suggested that creation of a federal securities commission would be facilitated if the recommended statute followed existing provincial legislation,
varying only where necessary for the administration of a federal act. Although
this approach would have had the advantages of immediate uniformity, it was
not adopted. Rather, the orientation of the background papers, and of the
Proposals,was to be toward principled recommendations on the merits of the
substantive issues under consideration. While the provincial acts and the experience under them received full and careful attention, they were not viewed
as binding precedents but only as examples of solutions, albeit Canadian ones,
among those possible. To have concluded otherwise would have undercut
much of the purpose of the Study, for it would have restricted unnecessarily
the scope of the policy alternatives that might have been available to the federal government, especially as the Proposalswere intended to provide a basis for
discussion with the provinces with a view to the formulation of a federal position. Equally important, no single provincial act could safely be followed. Although the Ontario legislation had provided the basic model for the western
provinces in the preceding decade, not all of those provinces had adopted the
amendments to it. Moreover, the provincial administrators were considering
the adoption of a new uniform act based on the recent Ontario bill; a second
version had been introduced in the Legislature less than a month before the
meeting and the final form of the bill could not then be predicted. 78 Thus, as
is apparent from the Draft Act, 79 although the provincial legislation received
substantial attention, the basic approach remained one of principle.8 0
The full Study group met three times. At the second meeting, held in
November 1975 and based on preliminary drafts of the background papers, 81
the basic policy questions raised in the papers were discussed and resolved,
generally on a consensus basis. After the meeting I prepared a section-bysection outline, with references to existing and proposed Canadian legislation,

77 A detailed outline of each background paper was circulated prior to the meeting
so that the coverage of the various papers and their relationship to each other and to
the Study as a whole would be understood by each consultant. The agenda was based
on these outlines.
78 See The Securities Act, 1974, Bill 75, 1974 (29th Leg. Ont., 4th sess.). The Bill
received first reading on June 7, 1974; the first meeting of the Study group was held on
July 3 and 4. In fact, there were four further bills introduced before an act was passed
in 1978; see 2 Proposalsat xv. See also supra, text accompanying notes 30-35.
79 See 1 Proposals; 2 Proposals. In some areas there was little Canadian experience
onwhich to draw; see, e.g., 2 Proposalsat 238 (Part 13).
80
The fact that the Study adopted a principled orientation does not mean that compromises were not made; any co-operative effort of the nature of the Securities Market
Study necessarily involves compromises of many types; see, e.g., 1 Proposals at viii
(Proposals reflect views of authors "as modified by the Study process"); see also, e.g.,
I Proposals,s. 13.03(4); 2 Proposals at 244-45; and see notes 88 and 90, infra.
81 Copies of each paper were circulated to every consultant and adviser prior to
the meeting. The agenda for the meeting was structured around issues with cross references to the papers in which they were discussed. The meeting ran from November
11-14, 1975.
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the A.L.I. FederalSecurities Code8la and other relevant statutory provisions,
to serve as a basis for drafting the initial version of the draft act and commentary which were to comprise the Proposals.The outline was sent to the conresponsibilities were
sultants and advisers for their comments, and the drafting
82
divided among Warren Grover, John Howard and me.
In all, four drafts of the Proposalswere prepared.83 The various parts of
the first draft, as they were completed, were sent to the consultants and advisers to whose work they were most directly related and formed the basis of
discussions among the draftsmen. We each then revised our initial drafts in
light of these discussions and any comments received, and the redrafted parts
were similarly sent to the consultants and advisers. The second drafts were
also discussed in detail at meetings with James C. Baillie and J. Peter Williamson and we again redrafted our parts to reflect the comments at those meetings.8 4 The third revision, the penultimate version of the Proposals, formed
the basis of the final meeting of the Study group in May 19 7 8;8m the policies
in the draft Proposalsand the manner of their implementation were discussed,
with emphasis on the former.8 6 Again a consensus basis was followed for resolution of issues except with respect to a few of the more contentious matters
on which votes were taken.8 7 At this meeting, as throughout the Study, it was
88
assumed that the views of the Study group would be reflected in the Proposals.
As with any work of three hands, the penultimate version of the Proposals reflected three different styles of legislative drafting and three different
approaches to the commentary. 89 It was therefore necessary both to integrate
them into a unified whole in style as well as content and to reflect the comments of the Study group. During the fall of 1978 I prepared the fourth and
final version of the Draft Act and Commentary and over the next three months
81a Supra note 75.
82 Mr. Grover accepted responsibility for parts 3 to 8, Mr. Howard for parts 9 to
11 and I for parts 1 and 12 to 16. The definitions, to be included in part 2, were
allocated on the basis of their connection with the other parts.
83 Copies of the drafts have been deposited in the Osgoode Hall Law School Library
in keeping with the general approach to the Study.
84 These meetings occurred in June 1977. In October 1977 Mr. Baillie was appointed
chairman of the Ontario Securities Commission and withdrew from the Study; see I
Proposals at x; see also "No household name, but experience is there", Executive
Magazine, Nov. 1977 at 26.
85A copy of the final version of each background paper was also sent to the

advisers.

86 As the draft Proposals were substantial, the meetings emphasized major issues
of policy and drafting. The Study group was asked to make any other comments in their
copies of the draft Proposals and leave them with me.
87 See, e.g., 2 Proposals at 134 (foreign ownership of securities firms), 237 (civil

liability for market transactions) and 367-68 (appeals from decisions of the Canadian
Securities Commission).
88 See supra note 80. As a result a given provision of the Proposals may not fully
reflect the views of each of the authors, although in only two instances was there a
sufficiently strong difference to warrant a dissent; see note 91, infra.
89 Compare, e.g., I and 2 Proposalswith the Mutual Fund Proposals,supra note 45,
and the Business CorporationProposals,supra note 50.
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met with my co-authors to review the draft final version and to resolve any
remaining policy differences. As a result of those meetings a number of minor
alterations were made ° and two dissents registered."'
Although no general theory of drafting underlies the Proposals, an attempt was made to draft the statute in a clear manner that would be understandable to a knowledgeable layman without losing the precision required
in technical legislation. 2 The Commentary reflects a similar attempt through
the use of introductory sections which provide an overview of each part in non93
technical terms and frequent explanations of various drafting techniques.
This approach was especially important with the Proposalswhich were intended to invite comments not only from lawyers, accountants, securities administrators and other experts, 94 but also from members of the securities industry,
corporate issuers and investors. 95
As the Proposals were also intended to provide a basis for discussion
with the provinces on possible methods of developing a comprehensive co90 The availability of a KWIC (key word in context) index of the penultimate draft
facilitated preparation of the final version.
It may, however, turn out that not all of the alterations were minor. The draft final
version omitted subsections 10.05(2) and 10.07(2) which prescribe the effect of a
transfer and pledge of a security on the records of a clearing agency in terms of bearer
form security certificates. The subsections were reinserted during the review, after some
difference of opinion, those who had misgivings having concluded that, although apparently inconsistent with subsections 10.03(3) and 10.04(5), the provisions were merely
redundant because the rights of security holders, once a security is deposited with a
clearing agency and until the security is withdrawn in accordance with section 10.13, are
expressly defined in sections 10.11, 10.12 and 10.17. However, as the provisions give a
transferee the same rights a clearing agency is given under subsections 10.03(3) and
10.04(5), they may increase the difficulties discussed by Professor Guttman and Mr.
Lemke; see Guttman and Lemke, The Transfer of Securities in Organized Markets
(1981), 19 Osgoode Hall L.J. 400, text accompanying notes 182-87. It may be preferable to delete all of the provisions referring to certificates in bearer form and to substitute a simple declaration that a clearing agency is the legal owner of securities in its
records so that the provisions in Part 10 expressly defining the rights of various persons
with respect to securities in a clearing agency's records will alone be determinative of
such matters.
91 See 1 Proposals,ss. 13.07(1) and 13.09; 2 Proposalsat 237, 259-60 and 264.
92
See, e.g., 1 Proposals, ss. 3.01(e) and 7.03(2) and 2 Proposals at 49-50 and 112,
respectively.
93
See, e.g., 2 Proposals at 7-8 (definitions), 45-46 (exemptions) and 381-82 (general provisions). If the Draft Act is enacted, the Commentary, and any published
Parliamentary proceedings, may be used as aids to the interpretation of its provisions;
see 1 Proposals,s. 16.16(1); 2 Proposals at 396-97.
94 See 1 Proposals,s. 2.19 ("expert").
95 The fact that the Proposals were to be released as a discussion document, rather
than as a bill to be introduced in Parliament for immediate enactment, also provided the
flexibility to experiment, in a few instances, with novel approaches to particular issues
such as the sale of a large amount of securities by non-control persons for which a
sales effort is required; see 1 Proposals, s. 2.17(d), defining such a sale as a "distribution," and ss. 5.02-5.04 which require the filing of a "block distribution circular" in
connection with such a distribution. The provisions were included "as a means of focusing attention on the potential implementation of the recommendation to invite discussion
and thus obtain a more accurate evaluation of... [their] likely consequences." 2
Proposals at 19. See also id. at 237 on civil liability for market conduct.
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ordinated national system for regulation of the Canadian securities market
and on legislative jurisdiction with respect to it, their release was to be timed
in consultation with the Federal Provincial Relations Office so that it might
complement the second phase of constitutional discussions outlined in A Time
for Action.96 In view of the fact that they do not reflect government policy, the
Proposalswere to be released with little fanfare but distributed widely to persons involved in the securities industry and other interested persons including
administrators and professionals outside of Canada 97 in order to encourage as
full a discussion as possible. Although an election intervened and a new Conservative government with a much less active constitutional stance than its
predecessor assumed power, the Proposalswere released as outlined, accompanied by a short press release which characterized them as a report to the
government and invited comments "from anyone interested in the Canadian
securities market."9 8
The immediate response to the Proposals,or rather to the idea of a federal securities commission,9" as reported in the press, was generally hostile. 100
96See Trudeau, supra note 11; and see Western Premiers' Task Force on Constitutional Trends, Third Report, supra note 71.
97 One of the factors suggesting federal legislation was the increasing internationalization of securities markets; see supra, text at note 45 and text accompanying notes
164-74, infra.
98 Consumer and Corporate Affairs Canada, supra note 2. A rather jumbled background summary accompanied the release; see Consumer and Corporate Affairs Canada,
Backgrounder Documentation, November 28, 1979.
Although the Proposals were released in the manner contemplated prior to the
election of the Conservative government, their distribution was in many respects inconsistent with the purpose for which they had been prepared; for example, several
months after their release, officials of federal-provincial relations offices across the
country had not received copies, nor had senior securities lawyers and members of the
securities industry of whom the Department was aware. Whether the disparity was
the result of a political decision by the new government not to promote the Proposals
or merely bureaucratic ineptness is not clear.
90 The newspaper reports of reactions to the Proposals' publication were published
within a few days of their release and before most of those interviewed had an opportunity to read the Proposals or to consider the implications of the scheme contained in
them; see, e.g., Stephens, supra note 4. A few respondents clearly stated that they had
not seen or read the Proposals;see Dennison, "Caution urged for federal rules on securities", Winnipeg Free Press, Nov. 30, 1979, 17, col. 1 at cols. 3-4. And one provincial
minister refused to comment until he had an opportunity to study them; see "No one
wants Ottawa to control securities market", The Gazette (Montreal), Nov. 30, 1979, 47,
col. 2 at col. 6.
100 See, e.g., Willoughby, "Federal agency for securities called unneeded", The
Globe and Mail (Toronto), Nov. 29, 1979 at B2, col. 3; Trigueiro, "Brokers and ASC
reject federal controls", The Calgary Herald, Nov. 29, 1979 at D1, col. 3; "We don't
need an SEC: Demers", The Gazelle (Montreal), Dec. 1, 1979 at 95, col. 2; "Industry,
administrators see no need for market regulation", The Chronicle-Herald (Halifax),
Nov. 29, 1979 at 1-F, col. 1. The Ontario minister's official statement was moderate in
its expression of reservations, indicating that the Ontario Securities Commission was
reviewing the Proposals "to determine whether federal involvement in specific areas of
the capital market system would simplify the quality of regulations"; Ont., Ministry of
Consumer and Commercial Relations, News release: Proposed Federal Securities Law
under Scrutiny: Drea (Nov. 28, 1979), reproduced in Notice 111, O.S.C. Weekly Summary, Nov. 30, 1979 at 4A; see also Stephens, supra note 4, at cols. 4-5.
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Indeed, the first sentence in one report declared the Proposals "as good as
dead'' and even those who did not view them as stillborn were less than
sanguine about the chances of their being adopted. 1 2 A number of representatives of the securities industry, however, also thought a federal agency likely4
3
to be beneficial in some respects, 1 as did a few provincial administrators.10
After the initial flurry the Proposalsbegan to receive more serious and systematic consideration. Securities lawyers have used them as a counterpoint
against which to evaluate current and proposed legislation' °5 and have attempted to assess aspects of the Proposalsin the context of current securities
law reforms. 1 6 Reviews in journals have started to appear. 0 7 And this symposium issue indicates that the Proposalsare likely to receive serious attention
from academic and practising lawyers concerned with securities regulation
outside as well as in Canada. 0 s Perhaps more important with respect to the
"No one wants Ottawa to control securities market", supra note 99.
See, e.g., Bloomfield, supra note 59; Anderson, "Call for commission brings
issue into focus", The Globe and Mail (Toronto), Nov. 30, 1979 at B2, col. 4. A few
professional journals included a description of the Proposals derived primarily from the
press release or background summary issued by the Department; see Proposals for a
securities market law for Canada (1980), 45 Bus. Q. 45 (Spring) (edited version of
press release); SEC Canada inevitable? (1980), 113 CA Mag. 20 (February) (based
on Backgrounder Documentation, supra note 98).
103 See, e.g., Dennison, supra note 99, at col. 3 (might expedite filings for new
issues); "No one wants Ottawa to control securities market", supra note 99, at col. 5
(would be easier for underwriters and investors). The president of the Montreal Stock
Exchange, who had previously been the chairman of the Quebec Securities Commission,
was quoted as having said that a federal commission was undesirable, even though it
would simplify matters, because a single body would be harder to deal with than a
number of commissions; see "We don't need an SEC: Demers", supra note 100.
104 See id. (international trading); Willoughby, supra note 100 ("for regulating
international distributions": James C. Baillie, Chairman, Ontario Securities Commission);
Trigueiro, supra note 100, at col. 5 (involvement in regulation of international securities
transactions a federal "obligation": Joanne B. Veit, Chairman, Alberta Securities Commission). And see the statement of the Ontario minister in Stephens, supra note 4, at
cols. 4-5 ("federal government could be supportive in certain areas, such as interprovincial trading and international markets").
105 See, e.g., Chapman, "The Securities Act, 1978 and the Occasional Practitioner:
The Private Company Exemption is Not for the Meek," in Recent Securities and Corporate Law Developments (Toronto: Canadian Bar Association-Ontario, May 9, 1980)
II-I at 11-19- 11-20; Simmonds, "Directors' Negligent Misstatement Liability in the New
101

102

Scheme of Securities Regulation in Ontario," in Sarna, ed., Corporate Structure, Finance
and Operations (Toronto: Carswell, 1980) 291 at 343-46; Buckley, Small Issuers under
the Ontario Securities Act, 1978: A Plea for More Exemptions (1979), 29 U. Toronto
L.J. 309 at 364-65. See also Toronto Stock Exchange, Submission on Quebec Securities
Act Working Paper (Dec. 11, 1980), passim.
106 See, e.g., Simmonds, supra note 57. The Proposalshave also been considered in
works concerned with more general legal issues; see, e.g., Evans et al., Administrative
Law: Cases, Text, and Materials (Toronto: Emond-Montgomery, 1980) at 238-41 (rulemaking procedure); Braithwaite, Developments in Criminal Law and Procedure: The
1978-79 Term (1980), 1 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 187 at 204-205n. 74 (ignorance and mistake
of law as defences).
107 See Johnston, supra note 6; Simmonds, supra note 6.
108 All of the contributors to the symposium teach or practise securities law in the
United States. The Proposals have also been used in Australia in connection with a proceeding before the Trade Practices Commission to consider stock exchange commission
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formulation by the federal government of its policy concerning the securities
market, the Canadian self-regulatory organizations have created the Joint Industry Committee on a Securities Market Law for Canada to study and report
on the Proposals.1 9 And it has recently become apparent that a substantial
majority of the business community favour federal involvement in the regulation of the Canadian market." 0 In fact, in a recent survey seventy-three percent of the businessmen questioned favoured federal securities regulation, over
one third of whom thought that the federal government should have exclusive
jurisdiction over the field."'
The reservations concerning federal securities legislation expressed in
Ontario when the Proposalswere released appear to have hardened into strong
opposition during the past two years. The current Minister of Consumer and
Commercial Relations and the Chairman of the Ontario Securities Commission have recently asserted their unequivocal opposition on the grounds that
the federal government would likely use any power over the securities market
to further its regional economic policies" 2 and "to achieve broad social objec' 3
tives, such as nationalizing industry and for the redistribution of wealth.""
rates; see Australian Merchant Bankers' Association, Submission to the Trade Practices
Commission relating to the Application by the Australian Associated Stock Exchanges
for the Authorisation of their Rules, Regulations and By-Laws (June 23, 1981) at 21-23.
See also Australian Merchant Bankers' Association, Third Submission to the Campbell
Committee of Inquiry into the Australian FinancialSystem (March 1981) at 7 and 10;
and see id., App. Al which reproduces 1 Proposals,ss. 9.03-9.10 and 15.17-15.19.
109See supra note 5. The Alberta, Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver Stock Exchanges and the Investment Dealers Association of Canada are represented on the
Committee. The Committee held its first meetings in March and April 1980 but appears
now to be inactive.
110 See, e.g., MacIntosh, Banking in the Eighties: Remarks to the Canadian Club
of Toronto (November 3, 1980) at 12 ("the business community would almost certainly welcome very warmly" a federal commission).
111 See Catherwood, "Business speaks out on the constitution", Tie Financial Post,
Sept. 6, 1980 at 9, col. 3. Of the executives surveyed 48 percent thought "securities
legislation should be a joint federal-provincial responsibility" and 25 percent thought
"it should be solely a federal responsibility." id., at col. 6. The remaining 27 percent
favoured exclusive provincial control. The survey found that 58 percent of the executives
included from Ontario favoured federal involvement, 41 percent favouring concurrent
jurisdiction and 17 percent exclusive federal; a further 41 percent favoured provincial
control alone.
112 See Ont. Leg. Standing Comm. on Administration of Justice, Estimates, Ministry
of Consumer and Commercial Relations, No. J-13 (Nov. 4, 1981) at 261 ("Both of us
loath to see any involvement of the federal government in this area.... I am sure the
problem with the federal government would be that they would make their decisions
based on regional economic expansion. We are liable to have the Toronto Stock Exchange located in Grand Bank, Newfoundland, or in Moncton.... ." per The Honourable
Gordon Walker). All of the proceedings before the Standing Committee involving the
Ontario Securities Commission are reproduced at 2 O.S.C. Bull. 239A (Nov. 27, 1981).
113 Willoughby, "Knowles believes OSC could be self-supporting", The Globe and
Mail (Toronto), Oct. 6, 1981, B2, col. 3 at col. 5 (quoting Henry Knowles, Ontario
Securities Commission Chairman). Mr. Knowles used the examples to support his conclusions that a "federal securities commission ...[sic] would be a disaster.... If the
federal government were to get involved in securities regulation, it would destroy the
capital markets as we know them today." id.
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Even though a glance at the Proposalsdemonstrates the baselessness of such
assertions,11 4 the Minister has stated that all of his provincial counterparts are

agreed that the federal government should not enter the field 1 6 and they have
the support of some members of the opposition in Ontariol" and of the opposition in Quebec. 117 The views of these ministers concerning a threat to their

own portfolio, however, are understandably stronger than those expressed by
a number of provincial premiers who appear ready to include the regulation of
the securities market as a matter for discussion in future constitutional conferences.

8

The universal opposition of provincial ministers with responsibility for
securities legislation may also be belied by the securities acts in Alberta and
Manitoba that are modelled on the Ontario legislation. 1 9 The Manitoba Securities Act, 1980 contains provisions expressly authorizing the Manitoba Commission to co-operate with a federal agency in its decision-making 120 and the

114 Cf., e.g., Johnston, supra note 6, at 626 (Proposals "refine existing legal principles rather than strike bold new approaches"). The policies suggested by the Minister
and the Chairman are extraneous to the Proposals as is clear from the Draft Act's
purpose clause; see 1 Proposals,s. 1.02. An attempt to impose them would be beyond
the Commission's jurisdiction under the Draft Act and could be overturned on judicial
review; see 1 Proposals,Parts 5 and 9; and see id., s. 15.19. Indeed, a securities act is
not an appropriate vehicle for the accomplishment of such policy goals; if the federal
government wishes to achieve them, it can undoubtedly do so more directly; see, e.g.,
Hogg, ConstitutionalLaw of Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1977), c. 4 (federal-provincial
financial arrangements); and see, e.g., Regional Development Incentives Act, R.S.C.
1970, c. R-3; Department of Regional Economic Expansion Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. R-4;
H. of C. Parliamentary Task Force on Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements, Fiscal
Federalism in Canada (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1981). The Constitution Act, 1981 embodies the device of equalization payments as a constitutional commitment of the federal government; see Resolution respecting the Constitution of Canada, supra note 10, sched. B, s. 36(2).
115 See Ont. Leg. Standing Comm. on Administration of Justice, supra note 112,
at 261.
116 See Ont. Leg. Standing Comm. on Administration of Justice, Estimates, Ministry of Consumer and Commercial Relations, No. J-11 (Oct. 29, 1981) at 226 (Mr.
Renwick).
117 See Constitutional Committee of the Quebec Liberal Party, A New Canadian
Federation (Montreal, 1980) at 104. One of the reasons given for the proposed new
Quebec Securities Act was a need for Quebec to "occupy the whole field of its jurisdiction before the federal government acts on its own draft bill"; Quebec Securities
Commission, supra note 7, App. A at 2. The Proposals have also prompted similar
arguments for greater uniformity in provincial legislation; see Kennedy, "ASE felt likely
to show growth of natural resources industry", The Globe and Mail (Toronto), Jan.
3, 1980, B4, col. 4 at col. 6 (James Milliken, Alberta Stock Exchange President).
118See Mosher, "Davis wants cost-sharing revamped", The Globe and Mail (Toronto), Aug. 7, 1975 at 1, col. 8; Western Premiers' Task Force on Constitutional
Trends, Third Report, supra note 71, at 15.
119 See Ontario Securities Act.
120 See S.M. 1980, c. 50, s. 2(8) [hereinafter Manitoba Securities Act, 1980] which
permits the Commission to hold joint hearings with any body "empowered by a statute
of Canada or any province or territory thereof to administer or regulate trading in
securities" and to consult with it when making its decision (emphasis added). Section
116 also recognizes the possibility of a federal agency by enabling the Commission to
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new Alberta Act, while less clear, appears to do so as well. 121 Moreover, the
proposed Quebec Securities Act contains a provision, like one in the Proposals,
which authorizes federal-provincial interdelegation; the Quebec government
or the responsible minister may enter an agreement delegating the administration of powers under the proposed act to an agency of the federal government
or accepting a delegation of the administration of a federal act to the Quebec
Commission. 12 Thus both enacted and proposed legislation contemplates the
possible creation of a federal body with some regulatory power over the securities market.
The influence of the Proposals on provincial legislation appears not to
have been limited to enabling provisions respecting joint hearings and interdelegation but to have extended to the substantive provisions of recent and
proposed provincial acts. 123 The new act proposed by the Quebec Securities

publish insider trading reports filed with it in a "publication issued by the Government
of Canada or an agency thereof" as well as in a publication of another provincial
government or agency.
121 See Securities Act, 1981, S.A. 1981, c. S-6.1, ss. 16-17 [hereinafter Alberta
Securities Act, 1981]. Section 16 gives the Alberta Securities Commission the capacity
to exercise outside of Alberta any power granted it under the Act if the jurisdiction in
which the power is to be exercised authorizes it to do so; the Commission may also
hold joint hearings outside of Alberta with an "extra-provincial commission" concerning
any matter within its jurisdiction in Alberta. Cf. Bonanza Creek Gold Mining Co. v.
R., [1916] 1 A.C. 566, 26 D.L.R. 273, 10 W.W.R. 391 (P.C.); P.E.I. Potato Marketing
Bd. v. H.B. Willis Inc., [1952] 2 S.C.R. 392, 4 D.L.R. 146. Section 17 authorizes the
Commission to hold such joint hearings in Alberta. It is not clear whether a federal
securities commission is an "extra-provincial commission" within the meaning in the
sections. The phrase is defined in subsection l(g.1) in terms of another "jurisdiction"
but it is also unclear whether "a jurisdiction" within the definition or one conferring
power under subsection 16(1) would include the federal government. As the provisions
are susceptible of an interpretation that includes them, they will likely be so interpreted
if a federal commission comes into existence.
122 See Quebec Securities Commission, supra note 7, s. 296. Compare 1 Proposals,
s. 15.06; and see 2 Proposalsat 334-35. The Quebec provision may also authorize interprovincial delegation to a commission, like the Alberta Commission under the new
Alberta Act, with capacity to accept a conferral of power exercisable in Quebec; see
supra note 121.
123 The criteria for evaluating the success of the Proposals varied among my coauthors, some emphasizing more than others potential enactment of the Draft Act. It
isprobably preferable during the preparation of proposals for legislative reform to
refrain from a commitment to enactment in order to avoid as much as possible any
unconscious inclination to compromise the recommendations with a view to early introduction of a bill in Parliament. While most choices made in the formulation of the
Proposals involved questions of emphasis and degree, the introduction of factors relating
to the passage of legislation, albeit omnipresent, seems better left to the political process
when those considerations are inconsistent with a conclusion that would otherwise be
reached on the substantive merits, especially with respect to an exercise like the
Proposals which is intended to provide an analytic basis for political decision-making.
Indeed, undue emphasis on political practicalities necessarily involves a risk of prematurely excluding provisions that might turn out to be politically acceptable. The
general approach to the Proposals,therefore, was to develop a statutory scheme that is
both feasible in the present Canadian context and desirable in principle and to explain
fully the alternatives considered and the reasons for any specific provision so that the
recommended scheme might be considered not only in connection with federal policy
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Commission, for example, while compatible with existing securities legislation
in other provinces,'1 24 adopts a format like the Proposals' and is similar to
them in structure; in fact the sequence of the various substantive parts of the
proposed Act follows exactly that of the Proposals.' More significantly,
several of the essential requirements of the statute, such as the registration
of brokers, dealers and other securities professionals 2 6 and the supervision
of self-regulatory organizations,'12 7 reflect the approach of the Proposals.And
a substantial number of specific provisions adhere more closely in substance
to those recommended in the Proposals than to the existing provincial acts,
ranging from the period within which continuous disclosure documents must
be filed 128 to the defences available in an action for improper insider trading. 129 The proposed Act by no means follows the Proposals in every respect. Rather it attempts to integrate the conceptual approaches and provisions of the new Ontario Act with those in the Proposals and in several in-

formulation but also in connection with substantive reform of the provincial securities
acts; cf. supra, text accompanying notes 77-80. Such consideration is in my view all that
can reasonably be expected of an exercise like the Securities Market Study.
124 See Quebec Securities Commission, supra note 7, App. A at 2. The Quebec
Commission emphasized the "compatibility" of its proposed legislation with that of the
other provinces while acknowledging that it had not given great weight to "uniformity"
but had instead stressed basic principles; see, e.g., Racine, 'Valeurs mobili~res: un projet
de loi innovateur", Le Devoir (Montreal), Jan. 22, 1981, 7, col. I at col. 2. Mr.
Racine was closely involved with the preparation of the Commission's proposal; see
Letter of Grald A. Lacoste, Quebec Securities Commission Chairman (Oct. 3, 1980),
which accompanied the Working Paper.
125 Compare Quebec Securities Commission, supra note 7, App. B with I Proposals
at xix-xxiv (tables of contents). The Commission acknowledged that it had considered
the Proposals; see Quebec Securities Commission, supra, App. A at 1-2.
120 Compare Quebec Securities Commission, supra note 7, s. 133 with I Proposals,
s. 8.01 and with Ontario Securities Act, s. 24. The Quebec proposal bases its registration
requirement on the carrying on of business; see also 2 Proposals at 127-28 (comparing
approach of Proposalsand provincial acts).
127 Compare Quebec Securities Commission, supra note 7, Part VIII with 1 Proposals, Part 9 and with Ontario Securities Act, Parts VIII-IX; see also 2 Proposals at
145-49.
128 Compare Quebec Securities Commission, supra note 7, s. 78 with 1 Proposals,
s. 7.01 (90 days) and with Ontario Securities Act, s. 77 (140 days from end of financial
year); and see 2 Proposals at 110 (90 day period "clearly feasible"). The timing for
quarterly reports is, however, different in each; see Quebec, s. 79 (45 days); 1 Proposals,
s. 7.02 (30 days); and Ontario, s. 76 (60 days). The Quebec Securities Commission
has sent to the minister a revised, but not yet published, version of its proposed act
which apparently reverts to the period in the Ontario Act; see Kerr, "Draft securities
act tightens definition of takeover offer", The Globe and Mail (Toronto), Aug. 25,
1981, B1,col. 4 at col. 6.
129 Compare Quebec Securities Commission, supra note 7, ss. 188-190, 224-225
with 1 Proposals, ss. 12.02, 13.03-13.04 and with Ontario Securities Act, ss. 75, 131.
In brief, both the Quebec Act and the Proposalsapply to "tippees" and omit the defence
available under the Ontario Act to a person who proves he did not "make use of"
confidential information. (The Ontario Act does not apply to all "tippees".) The Quebec
Act, however, following the Ontario approach with respect to the scope of civil liability,
does not include a civil remedy for impersonal transactions; see 2 Proposalsat 221 and
238-39.
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stances departs from both.13 0 Nevertheless a comparison of the Quebec Working Paper with the Proposals indicates undeniably that the influence of the
latter was pervasive.
Although no other provincial act demonstrates the same degree of influence, legislation enacted or proposed in two provinces reflects the Proposals in some provisions. The Alberta Securities Act, 1981, while generally
following its Ontario predecessor, has a substantial number of variations in
detail, some of which appear to derive from the Proposals.The new Alberta
Act not only removes the "make use of" defence, like the Quebec Working
Paper, 131 but also includes a "chinese wall" defence similar to a draft provision included in the commentary to the Proposals.13 2 The Act contains as
well, in almost the same words as the Proposals,a section new to provincial
legislation which prohibits a person who is offering to trade in a security from
making representations relating to the market price of the security unless he
reasonably believes that the price results from an independent market. 3 3 And
it provides new protections for persons subject to an investigation by the
Commission 134 and imposes a new requirement that the Commission prepare
an annual report to be tabled in the Legislature.', Finally, and most significantly, the Alberta Act has added a new part authorizing the Commission, in
effect, to register self-regulatory organizations, specifying the duties of such
bodies once registered and authorizing the Commission to delegate to them
the administration of any of the Act's provisions with respect to their mem-

1s See, e.g., Quebec Securities Commission, supra note 7, ss. 58-60, which essentially
adopts the "seed capital" or "limited offering" exemption in Ontario Securities Act, s.
71(1)(p) but adds a modification deriving from 1 Proposals, s. 6.03 by expressly
exempting trades between persons who acquire securities pursuant to the exemption.
Compare also, e.g., Quebec, ss. 76-77 with I Proposals, s. 7.03 and with Ontario, s.
74 (timely disclosure).
131 See Alberta SecuritiesAct, 1981, ss. 119 and 171. To avoid liability a defendant
must prove that he did not know the confidential information in question. See also supra
note 129.
132 Compare Alberta Securities Act, 1981, ss. 171(3)(d) and (4) with 2 Proposals
at 221-22. The Alberta defence is more limited than the one suggested in the Proposals
in that it is available only with respect to civil liability and only when the insider trading
or tipping relates to a sale of securities. The provision in the Proposals would have
been included in the prohibition against insider trading in 1 Proposals, s. 12.02, and
thus available in both criminal and civil proceedings, and it would not distinguish
between sellers and purchasers. The defence was included in the Commentary rather
than the Draft Act because the advisers to the Securities Market Study were not convinced of its effectiveness but thought it advisable to draw attention to it to invite
discussion.
'33 Compare Alberta Securities Act, 1981, s. 70(4) with I Proposals,s. 12.04(2) (a).
The prohibited representations are likely to be covered in amendments to the Criminal
Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34 as well; see supra note 23.
134 Compare Alberta Securities Act, 1981, ss. 28-29 with 1 Proposals, s. 14.01 and
with Ontario Securities Act, s. 11; see also 2 Proposals at 304-308.
135 Compare Alberta Securities Act, 1981, s. 195 with 1 Proposals, s. 15.11; and
see 2 Proposalsat 341-43.
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bers. 136 The amendments to the Ontario Act recently proposed by the Ontario
Securities Commission include provisions to the same effect which would give
the Commission supervisory powers over associations of registrants equivalent

to those now exercised over the Toronto Stock Exchange. 13 7 Whether the proposed amendments came from the Alberta Act or reflect the influence of the
38
Proposalsmore directly is speculative.
It would appear, therefore, that the pronouncement of the Proposals'
demise was somewhat premature. The Proposalsare receiving attention from
securities lawyers and the securities industry in and outside of Canada and
appear to be taking a place in the ongoing process of securities law reform in
the provinces. Nor is consideration of them likely to be limited to these
spheres. The continued interest of the federal government during the last two
decades, 139 and the frequent recommendations for federal jurisdiction and legislation 140 suggest that they will still serve as a focus for the discussion that was
14 1
their primary purpose. Indeed the recent statements of the Prime Minister
142
and the Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs
confirm that the Proposals remain on the federal government's political agenda.
136 Compare Alberta Securities Act, 1981, ss. 48-53 and 176-183 with 1 Proposals,
Part 9 and with Ontario Securities Act, ss. 19-23; see especially Alberta, s. 183 and 1
Proposals, s. 9.05; and see 2 Proposals at 155-56. See also supra note 127.
37
'
See Securities Amendment Act, 1981, 2 O.S.C. Bull. 80A at 98A-99A (Nov.
13, 1981) ("Proposed Amendments Recommended to the Minister", ss. 18a-19).
138 One proposed amendment to the Ontario Act does appear to come from the
implementation in the Alberta Act of a stricter condition on the distribution exemptions.
The Ontario Securities Act, ss. 71(4), (5)(c) and (7)(c) impose a condition on the
resale of securities purchased pursuant to a distribution exemption that precludes any
"unusual effort... to prepare the market or create a demand for the securities." As the
adjective, "unusual," creates doubt about the type of efforts that may be permissible
under the Act and as there seems to be no reason to permit any "market grooming" in
such circumstances, the Proposals preclude any such activities in an analogous exemption; see 1 Proposals,s. 6.04(2) (b); 2 Proposalsat 103. The Alberta Act accomplishes
the same result simply by deleting "unusual"; see ss. 109(2) and 112. (But see s.
110(2)(c) which mysteriously retains the term.) And the proposed amendments to
the Ontario Act would do the same; see Securities Amendment Act, 1981, supra note
137, at 130A-137A.
Similarly, the exemption contained in the Proposals for trades between persons
who purchase securities in a limited offering which found its way into the proposed
Quebec Act, see supra note 130, is included in the Alberta Act and has been recommended in the proposed Ontario amendments; see Alberta Securities Act, 1981, ss.
107(l) (t) - (t.3); Securities Amendment Act, 1981, supra note 137, at 127A (proposed
new s. 71(1) (v). Cf. Metafuse Ltd., 3 O.S.C. Bull. 4D at 5D (Jan. 15, 1982) (para.
E(iv)).
139 See supra, text accompanying notes 17-29.
140 See, e.g., Can. Special Joint Comm. of the Sen. and H. of C. on the Constitution of Canada, Final Report (1972) at 88 (recommending concurrent federal and
provincial legislative jurisdiction over securities).
141 See "Doesn't foresee unilateral move, Trudeau states", supra note 9.
142
-See Ouellet, supra note 8. Mr. Ouellet's statement of his intention to turn his
attention to the Proposals and his request for comments from the provinces attracted
much attention in the press; see, e.g., McGillivray, "Who should regulate our stock
markets?", The Gazette (Montreal), Feb. 9, 1981 at 13, col. 1; "Ottawa studies controls
over securities markets", The Globe and Mail (Toronto), Feb. 6, 1981 at B9, col. 6.
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Any other position would be surprising, for the factors that indicated a
need for federal regulatory involvement in the securities market in 1979 are
still present and, if anything, have been reinforced by events during the past
two years. The Proposals are premised ultimately on the national and international character of the Canadian securities market and its importance to
the economic welfare of the country.143 The fact that the market is national
in scope has long been acknowledged 144 and is demonstrated by the cooperative efforts of the provincial commissions with respect to the adoption
of national policies 45 and by the statutory authorization for and increasing
frequency of joint hearings held by a number of provincial commissions to
decide issues that transcend provincial boundaries."4 Further demonstration
is apparent even in technical provisions in recent provincial legislation, for
example, the "seed capital" and "government incentive" exemptions from
the prospectus requirements in the new Alberta Act and proposed Ontario
amendments which limit solicitations to a specified number of persons "in all
143 See 1 Proposals, s. 1.02 (purpose of Draft Act); cf. Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, § 1lA(a)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78k-l(a)(1)(A) (securities markets "an important national asset which must be preserved and strengthened"). Canada's requirements for investment capital during the remainder of this century demonstrate vividly
the importance of an efficient securities market; see I Proposals, ss. 1.02(a)-(c); 2
Proposalsat 2; and see Kniewasser, Canadds Investment Program 1981-2000 (1981), 5
For. Invmt. Rev. 13 at 14 (Autumn) ("$6.2 trillion of new capital investment over
the next 20 years").
144
See, e.g., Kimber Report, supra note 18, para. 9.01; Can., Report of the Canadian Committee on Mutual Funds and Investment Contracts, supra note 23, c. 19; Que.,
Report of the Study Committee on Financial Institutions (Parizeau Report) (1969) at
133 ("essentially unified Canadian capital market and its close association with international markets provide motive enough for some degree of central and uniform regulation"). See also Ont. Leg. Standing Comm. on Administration of Justice, Estimates,
Ministry of Consumer and Commercial Relations, No. J-12 (Oct. 30, 1981) at 234
(statement of Henry J. Knowles, Ontario Securities Commission Chairman: "The OSC
posture for many years... has been to seek wherever possible either uniform laws or
compatible laws across the country in recognition of the fact that the capital markets
are not provincial but are indeed national if not international in context."). See also 2
O.S.C. Bull. 239A (November 27, 1981).
145 The first twenty-nine national policies dealt with the clearance of and requirements for prospectuses filed in connection with national distributions of securities; see
supra note 31. The current practice with respect to the adoption of new national policies

or amendments to existing policies is to request that comments be sent to all of the
interested provincial administrators; see, e.g., Draft National Policy: Unincorporated
Issuers: Requirement to Maintain a Register of Security Holders, 2 O.S.C. Bull. 86E
(November 27, 1981) (comments to be sent to administrators in all provinces and
territories except British Columbia and Prince Edward Island); Notice: Requests for
Comments: National Policy No. 2.A.S.C. Summary, November 13, 1981 at 3 (containing report of Task Force respecting National Policy No. 2 recommending amendments to policy; persons commenting requested to send copies of submissions to all
Canadian administrators). The proposed amendments to National Policy No. 2 were
also published in the Ontario Bulletin; see Notice: Draft Amendment to National Policy
No. 2, 2 O.S.C. Bull. 310A (December 11, 1981); Alberta Securities Commission,
Draft Amendment to National Policy No. 2, 2 O.S.C. Bull. 88E (December 11, 1981).
140

See supra, text accompanying notes 119-22. In the last six months joint hearings

have been held to consider questions relating to the use of non-voting common shares,
stock exchange commission rates and public ownership of securities firms. See notes
151-55 and accompanying text, infra.
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jurisdictions including" the enacting province. 1 47 Moreover, the recent efforts

of the Ontario Securities Commission to apply the follow-up offer provisions

of the Ontario Act to transactions occurring outside of the province 4s and
to ensure that persons outside of the province observe minimum standards
49
of conduct at the risk of losing their right to trade in securities in Ontario
147 See Alberta Securities Act, 1981, ss. 107(l)(p)-(s); subsections (p) and (q)
permit solicitation of up to fifty "prospective purchasers" and sales to twenty-five and
subsections (v) and (s) specify seventy-five solicitations and fifty purchasers. See also
Securities Amendment Act, 1981, supra note 137, at 125A-127A (ss. 71(1)(p) and
(z)). The limitation codifies the interpretation of the existing Act adopted by the Ontario
Commission; see Exemptions from Prospectus Filing Requirements after Proclamation
of the Securities Act, 1978, O.S.C. Weekly Summary, March 30, 1979, Supp. X-1 at 3.
14 8 See Ontario Securities Act, s. 91 (1), which requires a person who in purchasing
voting securities of an issuer sufficient to raise his holdings above twenty percent of
the outstanding voting securities pays a premium over fifteen percent above the average
of the security's closing price during the ten days preceding the purchase to make,
within 180 days of the purchase, a takeover bid for all securities of the same class held
by others; see also R.R.O. 910/80, s. 163. And see, e.g., In re Atco Ltd., [1980] O.S.C.
Bull. 412 (September) holding a purchase of shares of Canadian Utilities Limited by
Atco from IU International Corporation, in a private transaction in the United States,
subject to the follow-up offer requirement because the consideration paid for the Canadian Utilities shares consisted of IU International shares previously obtained by Atco
through a takeover bid made in accordance with the Ontario Act; see also id. at 425-29
(Commissioner Thom, dissenting).
A proceeding has recently been initiated before the Commission to require an
Alberta corporation which purchased control of another Alberta corporation in a private
transaction in Alberta to make a follow-up offer in accordance with the Ontario Act
because the latter corporation's shares are listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange; see
In re Universal Explorations Ltd., 2 O.S.C. Bull. 33D (November 6, 1981) (temporary
cease trading order to prevent subsequent amalgamation); ln re Universal Explorations
Ltd., 2 O.S.C. Bull. 52D (November 20, 1981) (extension of temporary order denying
exemptions); In re Universal Explorations (81) Ltd., 2 O.S.C. Bull. 55D (November 20,
1981) (extension of temporary cease trading order); In re Universal Explorations (81)
Ltd., 2 O.S.C. Bull. 57D (November 20, 1981) (temporary denial of exemptions); In
re Universal Explorations (81) Ltd., 2 O.S.C. Bull. 59D (November 20, 1981) (notice
of hearing); see also Willoughby, "OSC defers ruling on follow-up", The Globe and
Mail (Toronto), Jan. 16, 1982 at B5, col. 6 (adjourned until March 1982). And
see Caisse de dgp6t et placement du Quibec, 3 O.S.C. Bull. 45A (January 15, 1982)
(notice of hearing concerning alleged takeover bid); 3 O.S.C. Bull. 38B (January 15,
1982) (temporary denial of exemptions based on alleged takeover bid for Domtar Inc.).
A former chairman of the Commission has criticized it for "applying its rule
nationally even though no other province has a similar rule"; Baillie, "Shareholders'
Remedies," in Law Society of Upper Canada Special Lectures: New Developments in
the Law of Remedies (Toronto: De Boo, 1981) 21 at 32. And a committee of securities
lawyers established by the Commission to consider this matter has recommended that
the Commission refrain from extraterritorial application of the follow-up offer requirement in the Ontario Act; see Notice: Interim Report of the Committee to Review the
Provisions of the Act regulating Take-Over Bids, 2 O.S.C. Bull. 212A at 236A-238A
(November 27, 1981). Surprisingly, the Commission referred this question to a committee one of whose members represents one of the Alberta corporations involved in
the pending proceedings described in the preceding paragraph.
14 See, e.g., In re Clark, 2 O.S.C. Bull. 442C (November 20, 1981) (proceeding
to consider denial of exemptions for insider trading and tipping in British Columbia;
application dismissed, Commissioners Knowles and Bray dissenting); In re Kaiser Resources Ltd., 1 .S.C. Bull. 13C (April 10, 1981). The fact that the Commission has
jurisdiction to deny exemptions in order to protect the integrity of Ontario's market
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make clear that geographical borders are irrelevant to the functioning and
regulation of the securities market.
The Proposals cited the manner in which stock exchanges in Canada
obtain approval of their commission rates as another example of the transprovincial nature of the securities market.'5 0 The hearings held across Canada
late last year to reconsider the exchanges' commission rate structure strengthen
the conclusion in the Proposals.Although the Alberta and Quebec Commissions convened local hearings as well, 151 a joint hearing was held in Ontario
from persons who have engaged in improper conduct elsewhere does not detract from
the conclusion in the text.
The difficulties of ensuring compliance with provincial securities legislation by
persons outside the province are illustrated by the recent events involving the Caisse de
d~p6t et placement du Qu6bec, a major financial institution incorporated in Quebec
which "has the country's largest portfolio of Canadian stocks and bonds." Kerr, "New
law to cover Quebec agencies", The Globe and Mail (Toronto), Jan. 20, 1982 at BI,
col. 1. The Caisse has refused to file insider reports with any provincial securities commission because it is an agent of the Quebec Crown. This refusal led the Director of the
Ontario Securities Commission to conclude that he should not grant a receipt for a
prospectus filed by an issuer controlled by the Caisse and to submit a question to the
Commission concerning his decision. The Commission published a notice of hearing but
subsequently cancelled the hearing because of a change in the Director's position concerning the prospectus based on a declaration by the responsible Quebec minister, Mr.
Parizeau, that the proposed Quebec Securities Act will treat the Caisse in the same
manner as all other issuers of securities; see Gaz Mdtropolitain, Inc., 3 O.S.C. Bull. 5A
(January 8, 1982) (notice of hearing); In re Gaz Mitropolitain, Inc., 3 O.S.C. Bull.
33B (January 15, 1982) (cancellation of hearing). The Director's question is appended
to the notice of hearing; 3 O.S.C. Bull. at 6A-7A. The Ontario Commission has, however, attempted to preclude the Caisse from trading in Ontario by denying it the use
of the exemptions under the Ontario Act because of an alleged improper takeover bid
and its refusal to file insider reports; see Caisse de ddpt et placement du Qu6bec, supra
note 148 (takeover bid for Domtar Inc.); Caisse de dip6t et placement du Qudbec, 3
O.S.C. Bull. 44A (January 15, 1982) (notice of hearing); 3 O.S.C. Bull. 37B (January
15, 1982) (temporary order denying exemptions for failure to file insider reports). The
hearing to consider the orders is scheduled for January 25, 1982.
These events make clear that the enforcement techniques necessary to deal with
persons outside the province may not only be ineffective but may also be harmful to
local investors, for a refusal to permit the issuer, Gaz M~tropolitain, to raise capital
in Ontario affects its minority shareholders as well as the Caisse; cf. In re Bralorne
Resources Ltd., [1976] O.S.C. Bull. 258 (September); Anisman and Hogg, supra note
15, at 140 (effect of cease trading order to prevent stock exchange takeover bid deprived
Ontario shareholders of opportunity to obtain premium). They also highlight the fact
that the doctrine of crown immunity with respect to the normal application of legislation is not appropriate in an age when governments and their agents are direct participants in business affairs; see, e.g., Kerr, "OSC's Gaz Metro decision may stop Ontario
issues", The Globe and Mail (Toronto), Jan. 8, 1981 at B8, col. 1. The Quebec
minister has stated that the new Quebec Act will apply to governments and their agents;
see Kerr, "New law to cover Quebec agencies", supra. See also 1 Proposals,ss. 2.29(c)
and 16.15; 2 Proposals at 26 and 396 (Draft Act applies to federal and provincial
governments and their agents).
150 See 2 Proposals at 3; Anisman and Hogg, supra note 15, at 139.
151 See Public Hearing:In re Broker Commission Rate Structures,A.S.C. Summary,
November 27, 1981 at 1 (notice of hearing to be held December 17, 1981); Avis d'audience publique: Objet: Courtages sur les opirations du bourse, 12 Q.S.C. Bull. 1
(August 25, 1981, no. 34); 12 Q.S.C. Bull. 6 (September 1, 1981, no. 35); 12 Q.S.C.
Bull. 2 (September 8, 1981, no. 36).
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by the Alberta, British Columbia and Ontario administrators and attended by
152
members of the Quebec Commission in an "official observer" capacity.
These administrators have apparently "acknowledged that if one jurisdiction
determines to deregulate commission rates, that in itself would have an impact
on the financial markets of the other jurisdictions in Canada where there are
exchanges" and as a result have come to a "gentleman's understanding...
that if one jurisdiction determines to deregulate commission rates, it will make
the determination but postpone the effective date for some months to allow
the other jurisdictions to react to the decision."'16 3 Recognition of the national
character of the securities market was reflected as well during the past year
in the manner in which the provincial commissions handled a moratorium
imposed on the issuance of "restricted" common shares, hearings to consider
whether to permit their useM and a hearing to consider a by-law of the Toronto Stock Exchange concerning the public ownership of member firms. 1 5
152 Ont. Leg. Standing Comm. on Administration of Justice, supra note 144, at 236
(testimony of Henry J.Knowles). Although invited, the Manitoba Commission did not
participate "because of the relative inactivity" of the Winnipeg Stock Exchange and
"budget constraints"; id. See also In re Part XV of the By-laws of the Toronto Stock
Exchange: Notice, 1 O.S.C. Bull. 96A (May 22, 1981) (copies of submissions to be
provided to Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario and Quebec administrators
and to the Toronto Stock Exchange).
153 Ont. Leg. Standing Comm. on Administration of Justice, supra note 144, at 236
(Henry J. Knowles). The Commissions have not yet published their decisions. The
Chairman of the Ontario Commission has stated that the decision will be made in the
form of a recommendation to the minister; see id. at 237. And the minister has recently
requested further representations from the industry pending receipt of the Commission's
recommendations; see Walker, supra note 35, at 6; 3 O.S.C. Bull. at 36A; and see
Willoughby, "Walker suggests willingness to assist dealers on issue of fees regulation",
The Globe and Mail (Toronto), Jan. 16, 1982 at B5, col. 4. This approach is perhaps questionable as the Ontario statute requires the decision to be made by the
Commission; see Ontario Securities Act, s. 22(2) (b).
164 The Ontario Commission announced its concern over the use of equity shares
with restricted voting rights and that of the British Columbia, Manitoba and Quebec
administrators in June 1981, gave notice of a hearing and declared a moratorium on the
distribution of such shares; see O.S.C. Interim Policy No. 3-58, 1 O.S.C. Bull. 46E (June
26, 1981); O.S.C. Interim Policy No. 3-59, 1 O.S.C. Bull. 48E (June 26, 1981). The
moratorium announced in the latter policy was joined by the Montreal, Vancouver and
Toronto Stock Exchanges but not by the Alberta or Manitoba Commission. The hearing
was held by the administrators of Alberta, British Columbia and Ontario and attended by
official observers from Quebec; both Alberta and Quebec held separate hearings. The history of the affair is outlined in O.S.C. Interim Policy No. 3-58: Restricted Shares (Uncommon Equities),Distributionsand Disclosure,2 O.S.C. Bull. 77E (November 20, 1981); and
see Ont. Leg. Standing Comm. on Administration of Justice, supra note 144, at 237-41
(Henry J. Knowles). The most recent interim policy reflects the position of the Ontario and
Quebec Commissions. See also Avis d'audience publique, 12 Q.S.C. Bull. 2 (September
1, 1981, no. 35); Re le placement, et 'amission 4 la cote de la Bourse de Montriat
d'actions ordinaires ne comportant pas droit de vote, 12 Q.S.C. Bull. 1 (November 17,
1981, no. 46). And the Ontario Commission adopted a final policy as of January 22,
1982; see O.S.C. Policy 3-58: Restricted Shares (Uncommon Equities), Distributionsand
Disclosure, 3 O.S.C. Bull. IE (January 22, 1982).
155 See Notice: Public Ownership in the Canadian Securities Industry, 2 O.S.C. Bull.
9A (July 10, 1981) (hearing by British Columbia and Ontario, Manitoba to be represented, and Alberta and Quebec invited to send representatives; copies of submissions
to be sent to these administrators and to Alberta, Montreal, Toronto, Vancouver and
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Nevertheless, despite their acceptance of the extraprovincial effects of a

decision concerning any of these matters, the provincial administrators
must make their decisions on the basis of the consequences for their own
province. 50
The Proposals also referred to developments in computer technology
which highlighted the increasing national aspects of the securities market
through the use of automation for the dissemination of information relating
to trading through the exchanges, for the clearing and settlement of securities
and even for the trading of securities. 157 In fact the "Computer-Assisted Trading System" ("CATS") then being tested by the Toronto Stock Exchange
created the potential for "an automated Canada-wide trading system which
would replace the trading floors of ...the Canadian exchanges."' 8 Despite
the fact that the CATS system is still being assessed, the Toronto Stock Ex-

Winnipeg Stock Exchanges and Investment Dealers Association of Canada); News
Release, 2 O.S.C. Bull. 37A (August 21, 1981) (announcing Ontario Commission's
approval of Toronto Stock Exchange by-law and imposing conditions). The hearing was
also attended by the federal Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs. The
release represented a consensus among the British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario and
Quebec administrators, apparently reached despite some differences; see id. at 38A;
see also Willoughby, "Hearing reveals split between OSC, QSC", The Globe and Mail
(Toronto), July 28, 1981 at B5, col. 4; Kerr, "Quebec taking new approach to securities
law", The Globe and Mail (Toronto), Aug. 25, 1981, B9, col. 7 at col. 8. See now
O.S.C. Policy No. 3-62: Public Ownership of Dealers, Conditions of Registration, Diversification and Institutional Ownership, 2 O.S.C. Bull. 103E (December 18, 1981).
The Commission has also announced its intention to hold a joint hearing concerning diversification and institutional ownership of securities firms; see Notice of Intention
to Hold a Public Hearing, 2 O.S.C. Bull. 318A (December 18, 1981). But the Quebec
Commission is conducting its own study; see Avis: Objet: La participation du public et
des institutions financiares4i la proprigt des firmes de courtage, 13 Q.S.C. Bull. 2 (January 19, 1982, no. 3); "QSC venture plans to study brokerage", The Globe and Mail
(Toronto), Jan. 23, 1982 at B5, col. 5 (joint research team with Montreal Stock
Exchange).
156 See, e.g., Ont. Leg. Standing Comm. on Administration of Justice, supra note
144, at 237; In re ProposedAmendments to Part XV of the By-Laws of the Toronto
Stock Exchange, [1973] O.S.C. Bull. 107 at 126 (August) ("we have been as sensitive
to the national interest as our duty to the Ontario public permits"). The dominance of
provincial interest was also shown in Alberta's refusal last summer to join the moratorium on non-voting and restricted voting common shares because the Alberta Commission had received no complaints and the Alberta legislation (including the new Act)
does not require a follow-up offer; see Slocum, "Dealing in special shares placed under
moratorium", The Globe and Mail (Toronto), June 30, 1981 at Bl, cols. 3-4. And see
Anisman and Hogg, supra note 15, at 142.
157 See 1 Proposals, ss. 1.02(d)-(e); 2 Proposals at 2-3. See also R.R.O. 910/80,
s. 140(1)(b) which exempts trades made through the facilities of a recognized stock
exchange where the trades are effected by "telephone or other telecommunications equipment linking the facilities of that stock exchange with the facilities of another [recognized] stock exchange" and are made in a type or class of security designated by the
Commission between dealers registered in their respective provinces in Canada. The
exemption is intended to facilitate trading in exchange-traded options. And see Securities
Amendment Act, 1981, supra note 137, at 108A-109A (s. 34(1)28).
158 Anisman and Hogg, supra note 15, at 140; see generally Cleland, supra note 41;
Jenkins, supra note 43.
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change recently decided to retain an expanded trading floor in its new building'l 9 and to increase the use of automation in the support facilities for the
new floor but not in the execution of trades.' 6 ° As the automated support systems have apparently been designed to facilitate transactions on a trading
floor, the Exchange's decision appears to preclude the use of computer assisted trading in actively traded securities." 6 ' The fate of the CATS system is,
however, not yet clear; it is therefore probable that an attempt will be made
to ensure that the support systems for the new floor are compatible with computer assisted trading in the event that CATS is successful. In any event, the
recent success of the Canadian Depository for Securities in connection with
the new issues of shares deposited with it by two resource corporations to
enable them to comply with the requirements of the federal Petroleum
Monitoring Agency concerning ownership of their shares 62 increases the
likelihood of a successful book-based system for securities transfers and con63
comitantly the potential for a Canada-wide trading system.
These developments reinforce the potential impact of automation on the
already increasing internationalization of securities markets. 16 4 Indeed, the
continued movement in the United States toward the national market and
clearing systems mandated by Congress in 1975' adds support to the prediction in the Proposalsof "links between the two markets, facilitated by computer technology and clearing mechanisms that already exist,"' 166 especially in
light of the fact that over fifty percent of the trading in shares of Canadian

150 See Slocum, "Heightened activity prompts TSE to consider putting up new
tower", The Globe and Mail (Toronto), Jan. 3, 1980 at B1, col. 4; Chevreau, "Shouting won't die when TSE moves; it will get louder", The Globe and Mail (Toronto),
October 3, 1981 at B1, col. 1.
I0 See id. ("although floor traders will continue to handle most of the actual
trades, a multi-million dollar communications system will automate much of the process
before and after the transactions.").
161 See id. In view of the implications of the Exchange's decision for the structure
of the Canadian securities market, it might, in the current regulatory framework, properly be the subject of review by the Commission in a public hearing; see Ontario Securities
Act, s. 22(2) (a).
162 See In re the Canadian Depository for Securities Ltd., 2 O.S.C. Bull. 519C
(December 18, 1981) approving the use of the Canadian Depository so long as it ensures delivery to shareholders of materials sent by the issuer or an offeror. Compare 1
Proposals, s. 10.14; 2 Proposals at 190-92. See also Toronto Stock Exchange Bylaw
89-831 - 89-834.
20.06, 3 CCH Can. Sec. L. Rep.
16 3 See also, e.g., Dewey, "Computerized stock deals will be put to the test", The
Globe and Mail (Toronto), Dec. 5, 1981 at B1, col. 1.
164 See 1 Proposals, s. 1.02(f); 2 Proposals at 3-4. See also Guttman and Lemke,
supra note 90, text at note 205 and following.
16
5See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ IlA and 17A, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78k-i and
78q-1. See also, e.g., S.E.C., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 17516, February 5,
1981, [1981 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. See. L. Rep. 82,818 (proposed order requiring linkage of Intermarket Trading System and NASDAQ); In re American Stock
Exchange, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 17744, April 21, 1981, [1981 Transfer
Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 82,866 (linkage ordered by March 1, 1982).
166 2 Proposalsat 3-4.
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Stock Exchange and an American
corporations listed on both the Toronto
67
exchange occurs in the United States.1
It is not surprising, therefore, that provincial administrators are rdquired to deal with the local implications of international transactions such
as the acquisition of control of a Canadian issuer through purchases outside
of the country, 1 8 and frequently to resolve matters of international import
such as the foreign trading of Canadian securities' 69 and foreign ownership of
securities firms carrying on business in Canada, 170 on occasion reaching dif167 See Slocum, "ASC is examining foreign trading", The Globe and Mail (Toronto), May 1, 1980, B8, col. 2 at col. 3.
168 See, e.g., Anisman and Hogg, supra note 15, at 141 and 148-49 (acquisition of
control of Husky Oil Limited by Alberta Gas Trunk Line Company through purchases
on American Stock Exchange). Although Alberta Gas acquired control in the United
States, the Ontario Securities Commission characterized the purchases as subject to its
jurisdiction, but within an exemption in the Act for acquisitions through the facilities of
a stock exchange, and announced it was considering the possibility of regulations to
confine the exemption; see Notice I: Husky Oil Ltd., O.S.C. Weekly Summary, June 29,
1978 at 2A; cf. Anisman, supra note 30, at 51-57. The Commission subsequently published for comment a draft regulation, intended to preclude such acquisitions, premised
on the conclusion that "an offer made through a stock exchange outside Ontario is made
to security holders resident in Ontario", and stated its view that the new Ontario Act
when proclaimed would accomplish the same result; Notice I: Request for Comments
on Exemption for Take-Over Bids effected through a Stock Exchange, O.S.C. Weekly
Summary, July 21, 1978, 2A at 3A. Before the regulation was adopted Edper Equities
Ltd., after having been refused an exemption from the takeover bid provisions of the
Ontario Act, acquired control of Brascan Ltd. by the same means; see it re Brascan
Ltd., [1979] O.S.C. Bull. 108 (May) (denying application for exemption); Brascan Ltd.
v. Edper Equities Ltd., 477 F. Supp. 773 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (upholding legality of purchases under United States law). A little over a week later the Ontario cabinet adopted
the previously published regulation; see O.R. 310/79; Regulation 310/79 as to Exemption from Take-Over Rules through a Stock Exchange or Over-the-Counter Market,
O.S.C. Weekly Summary, May 11, 1979, Supp. D; [1979] O.S.C. Bull. 122 (May). It is
likely that the desired effect of the regulation was beyond the jurisdiction of the Ontario
Legislature and that the current Act too cannot be applied to preclude offers made outside of Ontario; see Anisman and Hogg, supra, at 149; In re Atco Ltd., [1980] O.SC.
Bull. 412 at 425-29 (September) (Commissioner Thom, dissenting).
169 See, e.g., Slocum "OCC will ask OSC for consent to list Canadian options on
U.S. exchanges", The Globe and Mail (Toronto), Jan. 13, 1982 at B21, col. 4. The
application is necessary because the Commission had permitted the Chicago Board Options Exchange to sell options in Ontario on condition that it not list options on Can;tdian securities; see In re Chicago Board Options ClearingExchange Corp., [1975] O.S.C.
Bull. 22 at 28-29 (January). The purpose of the condition was to permit the development of a similar market in Canada based on securities of Canadian issuers. See also
In re The Montreal Options Clearing Corp., [1976] O.S.C. Bull. 93 (March) (requiring
co-operation between Montreal and Toronto Stock Exchanges to develop single clearing
facility for Canadian options).
170 See, e.g., In re Bache Halsey Stuart Canada Ltd., 2 O.S.C. Bull. 493C (December 4, 1981). Although the Commission concluded that it is in the public interest to
permit the Bache firm to retain its Ontario registration because it provides unique
services to Ontario investors, it upheld the Toronto Stock Exchange decision refusing
approval of the transfer of the firm's ownership to the Prudential Insurance Company
of America. The orders are included in the same issue of the Bulletin; see 2 O.S.C. Bull.
326B and 328B (December 4, 1981). Approximately two weeks later the Commission
published notice of its intention to hold a public hearing to determine the question of
institutional ownership of securities firms, the issue on which the Toronto Exchange had
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ferent results. 1 71 Such matters, as well as the utilization of international mar-

kets by perpetrators of fraudulent schemes, 17s emphasize the difficulties that
must inevitably be encountered by a regulatory agency whose jurisdiction is
territorially limited' 73 and may help to explain why even provincial administrators have consistently supported federal legislation dealing with international aspects of the securities market. 174

Perhaps the strongest and most consistent impetus for federal legislation has derived from a desire for uniformity. 17 The adoption of national and
uniform policies and the consideration by the provincial administrators at
their semi-annual meetings of the bills that resulted in the Ontario Securities
Act, 1978, with a view to a new uniform act were similarly motivated. 176
These efforts and the consequent "progress... towards uniformity" led the
chairman of the Ontario Commission to question "the necessity or desirability" of broad federal regulatory involvement when the Proposals were released. 177 The degree of uniformity achieved by the provincial administrators,
based its refusal; see Notice of Intention to Hold a Public Hearing, supra note 155,; see
also In re Diversificationand Institutional Ownership in the Securities Industry, 3 O.S.C.
Bull. 16A (January 8, 1982) (notice of hearing by Ontario Commission; copies of submissions to be sent to Toronto Stock Exchange and Investment Dealers Association).
The Quebec Commission intends to conduct its own study of this issue in conjunction
with the Montreal Stock Exchange; see supra note 155. Both actions may create difficulties. The Ontario Commission's notice suggests that its hearing will be conducted
without the participation of any other provincial administrators. And the study announced by the Quebec Commission is being conducted jointly with the self-regulatory
organization that is subject to its regulation on an issue on which the Montreal Exchange
is likely to be influenced by its own interests or those of its members.
Compare the treatment of these issues in 1 Proposals, s. 8.02(4); 2 Proposals at
134 and 160-61 (criteria relating to ownership of securities firms to be determined by
Commission because, inter alia, the application of such a standard by a self-regulatory
organization "involves an inherent conflict of interest." at 160-61). See also Connelly,
"The Licensing of Securities Market Actors", in 3 Proposals 1265 at 1380-92.
171 Compare, e.g., In re Reynolds Securities (Canada) Ltd., 9 Q.S.C. Bull. 1 (March
7, 1978, no. 9) (requiring Montreal Exchange to approve transfer) with In re Reynolds
Securities (Canada)Ltd., [1978] O.S.C. Bull. 101 (March) (refusing approval). And see
Slocum, supra note 167; Connelly, supra note 170, at 1389-91. A similar divergence of
view between Ontario and Quebec appears to be developing with respect to public and
institutional ownership of securities firms; see supra notes 155 and 170.
172 See, e.g., 2 Proposals at 4.
173 See, e.g., Anisman and Hogg, supra note 15, at 147-53 (limitations on provincial
legislative jurisdiction); see also supra notes 148 and 168; and see "Uniform securities
rules wanted by regulators", The Globe and Mail (Toronto), Sept. 13, 1980 at B16,
col. 7 (securities regulators from eleven countries in North and South America).
174

See supranote 104.

See, e.g., supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text; see also Ont. Leg. Standing
Comm. on Administration of Justice, supra note 112, at 265 ("If there are differences
in the acts of the various provinces, that leads to a vacuum-type situation which might,
unfortunately, draw the federal government in." The Hon. Gordon W. Walker).
176 See supra, text accompanying notes 30-35 and 68. Cf. "Federal securities law",
The Globe and Mail (Toronto), Dec. 5, 1979 at B8, col. 7. (no need for federal
agency because "the very fear of having one got the provincial agencies to whip themselves into shape").
177 Stephens, supra note 4, at col. 6 (James C. Baillie).
175
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however, is not sufficiently substantial to support this position. Indeed, the
securities laws in Canada have not been uniform since the 1930s.178 Although
the attempts at uniform legislation in the late 1960s and at uniform administration in the 1970s were laudable, they did not remove substantial differences in legislation and policy. The acts in even the so-called "uniform act
provinces" vary in detail and substance,170 the national policies were criticized
soon after their adoption and have recently been declared to be in need of
revision 80 and in any event each of these provinces retains a residue of local
policies, some of which may be applicable to transactions involving more
than one province.' 8'
Nor is the new Ontario Act likely to lead to the uniformity envisioned
prior to its enactment. 18 Five provinces are apparently resigned to the retention of their present acts, 183 none of the three that have enacted or proposed new legislation follows the Ontario Act without variation and the re178 For a summary of the differences as of 1960 and 1966 see Williamson, supra
note 13, passim.
179 For example, the British Columbia legislation does not require the filing of a
preliminary prospectus and does not permit solicitations during a waiting period; see
Securities Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 380, s. 36; compare, e.g., Securities Act, R.S.S. 1978,
c. S-42, ss. 42-47. For the differences in the provisions governing takeover bids and
insider trading and reporting as of 1974 see Anisman, supra note 30, passim.
A broad overview of the legislative schemes in the provinces does not improve the
picture; there are essentially five models of securities acts currently in force in Canada.
British Columbia and Saskatchewan retain versions of the Ontario Act of 1966; Alberta
and Manitoba have the 1966 Ontario Act with the amendments enacted in 1971; see
supra note 30; and see The Securities Act, R.S.A. 1970, c. 333; The Securities Act,
R.S.M. 1970, c. S50. (The new acts have not been proclaimed; see jufia note 184.)
The Quebec Act is unique as it is the only one with a permit system for distributions;
see Securities Act, R.S.Q. 1977, c. V-1. The maritime provinces have versions of the old
Security Frauds Prevention Act with the addition of a provision requiring a registration
statement or prospectus when a distribution occurs; see Securities Act. R.S.N.B. 1973,
c. S-6; The Securities Act, R.S. Nfld. 1970, c. 349; Securities Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c,
280; Securities Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1974, c. S-4. The securities ordinances in the two territories are similar to the latter acts; see Securities Ordinance, R.O.N.W.T. 1974, c. S-5;
Securities Ordinance,R.O.Y.T. 1971, c. S-5. Finally, the new Ontario Act is also unique
at present. The prospects for uniformity are discussed in the text accompanying notes
182-93, infra.
18 0 See Lockwood, supra note 36; and see Ont. Leg. Standing Comm. on Administration of Justice, supra note 144, at 235 ("The national policy system.., is alive and
well and still functioning. It is suffering from some old age and from some antiquated
concepts and needs revamping very much." Henry J. Knowles).
181 The local policies are numbered as the third series; see, e.g., Alberta Policies
Nos. 3-01 - 3-21, 1 CCH Can. Sec. L. Rep. 1 24-501 - 24-521; British Columbia Policies
Nos. 3-01 - 3-33, 2 CCH Can. Sec. L. Rep.
29-951 - 29-996d; Ontario Policies Nos.
3-01 - 3.61, 2 CCH Can. Sec. L. Rep.
54-895 - 54-978a. (Several of the Ontario policies
have been adopted on an interim basis.) Ontario Policy No. 3-37 governs the conduct
of "going private transactions, issuer bids and insider bids" and Ontario Policy No. 3-41
deals with exemptions from the follow-up offer requirement. Both affect interjurisdictional conduct; cf. supra note 148.
182 See supra, text accompanying notes 35, 68 and 177. See also Ont. Leg. Standing
Comm. on Administration of Justice, supra note 144, at 234 (Henry J. Knowles).
183 New Brunswick, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island and Saskatchewan; see id. at 234-35 (Henry J. Knowles).
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maining province, British Columbia, is also unlikely to do so.184 The difficulty
of achieving uniformity is perhaps best exemplified by the treatment of the
follow-up offer and timely disclosure requirements of the Ontario Act in the
three provinces with new legislation. 185 Only one of the three, Manitoba, is a
potential "uniform act province" for purposes of the follow-up offer requirement; 8 6 Alberta has rejected it and Quebec, although initially rejecting it as
well, has indicated that it will enact a substantially different version. 187 And
while all three provinces have a provision mandating timely disclosure, each
varies to some extent from Ontario's and no two are identical. 88 In short, the
proposed Quebec Act, while compatible with the regulatory schemes in Ontario and the other provinces, differs both in format and substance; I'9 the
Alberta Act, while generally following the Ontario model, contains a number
of variations in detail concerning the types of matter for which uniformity is
usually advocated, such as the conduct of takeover bids and prospectus amend-

ments; 10 and the Manitoba Act, which approximates Ontario's most closely,
contains a few differences that require an issuer to make special provisions in
84
1
See id. Neither the Alberta nor Manitoba Act has been proclaimed in force;
the delay in the latter province is intended to permit amendments that reflect the experience under the Ontario Act; id. at 234.
185 See Ontario Securities Act, ss. 74 (timely disclosure) and 91 (follow-up offer);
see also supra note 148.
180See Ontario Securities Act, s. 88(1)(1); Manitoba Securities Act, 1980, ss.
88(1)(1), 91(1) and 129. A "uniform act province" is one specified in regulations as
having "legislation in effect containing provisions substantially the same" as those in the
act.
187 See Alberta Securities Act, 1981, Part 13; Quebec Securities Commission, supra
note 7, s. 106(2) (exempting offers not made to shareholders generally to purchase
securities from no more than five persons); see also Racine, supra note 124, at cols.
2-3, explaining that the exemption was included to permit economically desirable transfers of control and to enable pers6ns who control and manage a corporation to benefit
through receipt of a premium for their shares. The revised version of the proposed Act
submitted to the minister apparently limits the exemption to offers to purchase the
shares of the founding shareholders or of those actively involved in building the corporation over a long period, but does not specify a number; see Kerr, supra note 128,
at cols. 4-5. It appears that the revised Quebec Act may go far beyond any legislation
in Canada by treating an agreement to vote shares together as a takeover bid requiring
a follow-up offer; see id. at col. 5 (Caisse de d6p6t et placement du Quebec and
Soci~t6 Gndrale de Financement would be required to make a follow-up offer "since
they announced they are acting together"); cf., e.g., GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d
709 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied 92 S. Ct. 1610 (1972) (re accelerated reporting under
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)).
188 Compare Ontario Securities Act, s. 74 with Alberta Securities Act, 1981, s. 118,
Manitoba Securities Act, 1980, s. 74 and Quebec Securities Commission, supra note 7,
ss. 76-77. The Manitoba Act differs from Ontario only by the addition of a provision
authorizing the Commission to require an issuer to take appropriate steps to ensure
adequate dissemination of the information contained in a press release; s. 74(5). The
major difference in the other two is that they do not require that a confidential filing
be made with the Commission where public disclosure would be harmful to an issuer.
For a further variation see 1 Proposals,s. 7.03; 2 Proposals at II 1-12.
189 See supra notes 124-30 and accompanying text.
190 See supra notes 131-36 and accompanying text. See also Alberta Securities Act,
1981, ss. 134(4)-(6) granting a further ten day right of withdrawal in the event of a
competing takeover bid to offerees whose shares have been deposited but not purchased
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that province, for example, with respect to exempt distributions. 19' Finally,
British Columbia has announced its intention to introduce a new securities
act that appears not to be based exclusively on Ontario's. 0 2 And even Ontario itself may create further disparities, for the Minister of Consumer and
Commercial Relations has announced that he plans to create a committee
to revise the Ontario Act.193 Thus, while compatibility of the provincial acts
seems reasonably assured for the most part, the prospect of uniformity is
diminishing.
As the Proposals were intended to provide a basis for discussions that
would "ultimately lead to a coordinated and cooperative legislative scheme
for the regulation of all aspects of the Canadian securities market, 1 9 4 they
contain a comprehensive securities act which is divided into sixteen parts to
facilitate consideration of its various provisions and to enable the government more easily to adopt and sever the parts that it decides to enact.10 5 The
Draft Act incorporates the regulatory mechanisms commonly embodied in
securities legislation; it imposes disclosure obligations on issuers,'9 0 requires
market professionals to register'0 7 and proscribes improper conduct. 9 8 These
pursuant to the earlier takeover bid; and see s. 144 which prohibits offeree directors
from communicating with their shareholders during a takeover bid otherwise than by
means of a statutory directors' circular. And compare Alberta Securities Act, 1981, ss.
85-88 with Ontario Securities Act, s. 56(1). The Alberta Act does not require an amendment to be filed as soon as practicable and requires an amendment to a preliminary
prospectus if a non-adverse material change occurs; in both it differs from Ontario.
101 Compare, e.g., Manitoba Securities Act, 1980, s. 71(l) (h) (i) with Ontario
Securities Act, s. 71(1)(h)(i). The exemption in the Ontario Act applies to both a
rights offering and the subsequent exercise of such rights while the Manitoba Act exempts only the latter transaction but not the rights offering itself. As rights offerings
have traditionally been exempt from prospectus requirements in Canada, it may be that
the disparity is the result of a drafting oversight.
19 2 See Ont. Leg. Standing Comm. on Administration of Justice, supra note 144,
at 234 (considering all legislation in North America; Henry J. Knowles). An earlier
discussion paper on the new legislation suggested that British Columbia should adopt the
new Ontario Act with special provisions to enable junior resource companies to acquire
capital; see B.C., Revision of Securities Regulation in British Columbia: A Discussion
Paper (Victoria: Ministry of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, October 3, 1979). See
also Stanley, The Stanley Report (Victoria: Ministry of Consumer and Corporate
Affairs, 1981); B.C., Ministry of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, News Release:
Stanley Report Released, November 5, 1981 at 4. The publication of the Stanley Report
constitutes a desirable change in the Province's prior practice with respect to reports on
securities trading in British Columbia; see, e.g., Hoi-Yin, "Never-Released Study on
VSE: 'Little investor' odds prohibitive", The Vancouver Sun, Oct. 30, 1981.
3
19 See Walker, supra note 35, at 7-7A, 3 O.S.C. Bull. at 37A-38A; Willoughby,
"Ontario eyes changes for securities industry", The Globe and Mail (Toronto), Jan.
15, 1982 at Bll, col. 2.
194 1 Proposalsat ix.
19& See id. at viii-ix. See also s. 16.17 which declares the severability of every provision of the Draft Act in the event of a finding of invalidity; and see 2 Proposals at
397-98. The Draft Act does not attempt to regulate mutual funds or other financial
institutions; see supra, text accompanying note 61. It may, however, affect them in some
circumstances; see 1 Proposals, s. 3.02(1) (c); 2 Proposals at 52-53.
19 0 See I Proposals,Parts 4-7; 2 Proposalsat 59-64.
197 See I Proposals,Parts 8-10.
198 See id., Parts 11-12.
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substantive requirements are supported by civil and criminal remedies 90 and
by the creation of a commission with investigative, adjudicative and rulemaking powers.20 The Draft Act implements these regulatory techniques in a
manner that reflects modern developments in similar legislation with, of
course, a number of variations peculiar to it. In brief, disclosure is premised
on the registration of issuers whose securities are sufficiently widely held to
permit an active trading market to develop.201 Once registered they become
subject to an integrated continuous disclosure system designed to make technical data available to analysts and other professionals and to ensure that information is supplied to investors in a form that will be understandable to
laymen.20 2 Registration also enables an issuer to avail itself of trading exemptions from the prospectus requirements that are generally applicable to distributions of securities 203 and it is expected that such issuers will
be subject to
2 03
less onerous prospectus disclosure requirements than others. a
While the Draft Act varies the approach in the provincial securities acts
to licensing of brokers, dealers and other market actors by basing its registration requirement on the carrying on of business activities, it is generally compatible with them in substance. 204 It is also consistent with respect to selfregulatory organizations, even though it specifies a comprehensive regulatory
structure containing the standards according to which such organizations must
operate and according to which their conduct is subject to review by the
"Canadian Securities Commission'. 2 05 And it establishes a new statutory
scheme that would legitimate and regulate a book-based clearing and settlement system for securities transactions.200 Prohibitions supporting the regulatory scheme and reinforcing the integrity of the Canadian market range from
the conduct of market actors with respect to their customers -or to antifraud
199 See id., Parts 13-14.
See id., Parts 14-15. For a discussion of the Commission's powers of enforcement see Thomforde, Administrative Enforcement Powers and Procedures under the
Proposed Securities Market Law (1981), 19 Osgoode Hall L.J. 381.
20
1 See 1 Proposals, s. 4.02; 2 Proposals at 64-68. Registration involves the filing
of a registration statement.
202 See 2 Proposals at 59-64 and 108; see generally Parts 4 and 7.
'03 See 1 Proposals, s. 6.04; see generally Parts 5-6; 2 Proposals at 63, 71-74 and
102-103. The continuous disclosure system is also supplemented by disclosure related to
special events such as takeover bids; see 1 Proposals, Part 7D.
203a See 2 Proposals at 62-63.
204 See 1 Proposals,Part 8; 2 Proposals at 127-30; see also supra, text accompanying note 126.
20
5 See 1 Proposals,Part 9; 2 Proposalsat 145-49. It is worth noting that the Draft
Act would also authorize the Commission to delegate the administration of the Act's
provisions to a registered self-regulatory organization with respect to its members; 1
Proposals,s. 9.05. Apart from section 9.05, the major departure of the Draft Act from
the provincial acts lies in the articulation of the scheme rather than in its scope; compare, e.g., Ontario Securities Act, s. 22. On Part 9 generally see Ratner, Self-Regulatory
Organizations (1981), 19 Osgoode Hall L.J. 368.
200 See 1 Proposals,Part 10; 2 Proposals at 171-77. "Clearing agencies" are treated
as self-regulatory organizations; I Proposals, ss. 2.10 and 2.46. See also Guttman and
Lemke, supra note 90; and see supra note 162.
207 See 1 Proposals,Part 11; 2 Proposals at 197-98.
200
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provisions that would replace and supplement those in the Criminal Code
concerning manipulation and other forms of fraudulent activity.208 Finally,
the Draft Act attempts to ensure that a person who suffers harm as a result
of improper conduct in the securities market will be compensated in so far as
scheme of civil liability based on
possible by establishing a20comprehensive
9
violations of its provisions.
Although the Draft Act would create a "Canadian Securities Commission" to administer and enforce its provisions,2 10 its administrative structure
was devised to permit a maximum amount of flexibility so that any solution
resulting from discussions with the provinces might be accommodated. The
minister designated for purposes of the Act21' may, for example, negotiate
and enter an agreement with a provincial government whereby the administration of the Draft Act, or any part of it, is delegated to the securities commission in that province or whereby the Canadian Securities Commission undertakes responsibility for enforcement of the provincial securities act.2 12 Varying understandings with different provinces may thus be incorporated into a
single scheme.
Interdelegation is not, however, the only device contemplated in the
Proposals for the co-ordination of federal and provincial regulation of the
securities market. 21 3 The Commentary suggests that members of provincial
commissions might be appointed as part-time members of the Canadian Commission "to increase the degree of cooperation between the... Commission
and its provincial counterparts and to ensure that local needs are considered. '21 4 The Cabinet may also require the Commission to invite a provincial commission to designate one of its members to participate in any proceeding under the Draft Act-' 5 and the Commission may do so itself by appointing such a person as an expert. 21, The Commission may thus, like the
provincial commissions, hold joint hearings with members of another commission with overlapping jurisdiction in order to avoid duplicate proceedings2 11 and it may also avail itself of provincial expertise on matters within
208 See 1 Proposals,Part 12; 2 Proposals at 215-16; and see R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34,
ss. 338-342; see generally Leigh, "Securities Regulation: Problems in Relation to Sanctions," in 3 Proposals 509 at 514-31.
209 See I Proposals, Part 13; 2 Proposals at 235-38; see also Johnston, supra note

6, at 634 ("considerable improvement on existing law").
210 See 1 Proposals, s. 15.01. Part 15 of the Draft Act contains a code of procedure to govern the conduct of the Commission in the exercise of its powers and
provides for judicial review of Commission decisions; see ss. 15.13-15.21.
211 See id., s. 2.23.
212 See id., s.15.06; 2 Proposals at 334-35; and see supra, text accompanying note
122. If administration of the Draft Act is delegated, the provincial commission must
nevertheless comply with its provisions; 1 Proposals,s. 15.06(2).
213 For a discussion of these issues from a former state securities commissioner's
perspective see Makens, An American State-FederalPerspective on the Proposals (1981),
19 Osgoode Hall L.J. 424.

2 Proposalsat 332.
See 1 Proposals,s. 15.07; 2 Proposalsat 334-35.
216 See 1 Proposals,s. 15.10.
217
See supra, text accompanying note 146.
214
215
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its exclusive jurisdiction. Moreover, the Draft Act requires the Commission
to co-operate with provincial securities commissions and other provincial and
federal authorities "in order to minimize duplication of effort and maximize
the protection afforded investors" 218 and authorizes it to delegate the exercise
of its investigative and adjudicative powers to a provincial commissioner or
employee in furtherance of such efforts.2 19
The DraftAct contains as well a number of non-discretionary devices to
avoid duplication and to encourage harmonization of federal and provincial
regulatory schemes. It exempts intraprovincial distributions from the prospectus requirements in order to enable a provincial government to establish the
standards of investor protection for its own residentsP22 and also requires the
Commission to permit securities to be sold in any province that clears a prospectus even though it refuses permission with respect to other provinces.22 '
A similar duty is imposed on the Commission with respect to applicants for
registration under Part 8 of the Draft Act who are already registered under a
provincial securities act.2 22 All of these provisions facilitate co-ordination of
federal and provincial schemes by permitting a provincial decision to prevail
so long as only citizens of the particular province are affected. Finally, the
Draft Act avoids the unnecessary imposition of duplicate disclosure requirements by permitting issuers subject to its provisions to file similar reports required in the jurisdiction in which they are incorporated or organized.V 2 3 The
Draft Act thus provides a framework for a comprehensive national regulatory
scheme with a maximum amount of federal-provincial co-operation, co-ordination of requirements and a minimum of unnecessary duplication.
Federal-provincial co-operation is an essential component of the scheme
recommended in the Proposals22 4 both for reasons of policy25 and because
Parliament's legislative jurisdiction over the securities market is not plenary.2 26
While it is reasonably clear that Parliament may enact legislation with respect
to interprovincial transactions in securities 2 7 and interprovincial works and

218 1 Proposals,s. 15.12(1); see also 2 Proposalsat 344.
219 See 1 Proposals,s. 15.09; 2 Proposalsat 336-39. Similar powers are also granted
the Commission with respect to international transactions in securities; see, e.g., 1
Proposals, ss. 15.09 and 15.12; and see id., s. 16.16(2) (interpretation of act to implement treaties).
220 See 1 Proposals,s. 6.05; 2 Proposalsat 104-106 and 383-84.
221 See 1 Proposals,s. 5.10; 2 Proposalsat 85-86.
222

See IProposals,s. 8.03; 2 Proposalsat 135-36.

223

See 1 Proposals, s. 7.18; 2 Proposals at 121. The Commission may also accept
documents filed with other securities commissions under its general power to grant
exemptions; see s. 3.04.
224 The need for federal-provincial and international co-operation is recognized in
the purpose clause of the Draft Act; see 1 Proposals, s. 1.02; 2 Proposalsat 4-5.
22
5See supra, text accompanying notes 213-23.
226 There are, however, no constitutional limits on Parliament's extraterritorial
jurisdiction; see, e.g., Anisman and Hogg, supra note 15, at 150; see also id. at 201-14
(paramountcy).
227 See, e.g., id. at 157-61.
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undertakings,228 and also with respect to general matters of trade and commerce of transprovincial significance, " 9 it is doubtful whether it can do so to
regulate intraprovincial transactions in securities.m0 As an attempt to encompass both interprovincial and intraprovincial transactions would be of questionable validity,23 1 the Draft Act is framed to apply only to the former; it
expressly excludes intraprovincial transactions that are not made through the
facilities of a stock exchange 232 and is otherwise limited to matters of greater
than provincial import.2 33 Jurisdiction over the stock exchanges, for example,
is predicated on their being institutions of national significance which perform functions relating to "general trade and commerce" and the operations
of which make them interprovincial works or undertakings; 2 34 the remaining
provisions apply only to interprovincial transactions and businesses. 235 The
See, e.g., id. at 171-76.
MacDonald v. Vapour Canada Ltd., [1977] 2 S.C.R. 134, 66 D.L.R. (3d)
1, 22 C.P.R.(2d) 1 (1976) (dictum), discussed in Anisman and Hogg, supra note 15,
at 162-71.
230 On occasion the applicability of federal legislation to intraprovincial transactions has been upheld on the basis of the ancillary doctrine; see, e.g., Caloil v. A.G.
Can. No. 2, [19711 S.C.R. 543, 20 D.L.R. (3d) 472, [1971] 4 W.W.R. 37. Such a result
is rare, however, and is unlikely in view of recent Supreme Court decisions; see, e.g.,
Dominion Stores Ltd. v. R., [1980] 1 S.C.R. 844, 106 D.L.R. (3d) 581, 50 C.C.C. (2d)
277 (1979). The Dominion Stores decision is especially significant in view of the conscious disregard of the difficulty of determining the origin of a specific apple and the
potential application of the ancillary doctrine to which it gave rise; see, e.g., id. at 847
(S.C.R.), 584 (D.L.R.), 280 (C.C.C.) (per Laskin C.J. dissenting) and 855 (S.CR.),
590 (D.L.R.), 286 (C.C.C.) (per Estey, J.). The Court reversed the decision of the
Ontario Court of Appeal upholding the federal legislation on the basis of the ancillary
doctrine; see id. at 854 (S.C.R.), 590 (D.L.R.), 286 (C.C.C.).
231 See, e.g., Reference re Agricultural Products Marketing Act, [1978] 2 S.C.R.
1198, 84 D.L.R. (3d) 257.
232See 1 Proposals, s. 16.01; 2 Proposals at 383-84. The Draft Act defines an
intraprovincial transaction in terms of "a trade initiated and completed in a single province"; id. Thus a distribution of a security by a corporation in a province other than its
province of incorporation is necessarily interprovincial; see 1 Proposals, s. 16.01(2);
Anisman and Hogg, supra note 15, at 160.
233 See, e.g., 1 Proposals, s. 8.07. (person who carries on business "only in one
province" not required to register); 2 Proposals at 142-43; see also 1 Proposals, s.
9.01(2) (interprovincial association of securities firms); 2 Proposals at 150 ("to make
clear that it applies only to associations that have more than intraprovincial significance").
234See 2 Proposals at 383 ("transprovincial character"); see also Anisman and
Hogg, supra note 15, at 167 and 172-75.
=5 The requirement that persons carrying on a business obtain registration under 1
Proposals,Part 8, is constitutionally perhaps the most difficult part of the Draft Act to
justify; see 2 Proposalsat 128-29. The difficulty is exacerbated by the tone of a recent
Supreme Court decision declaring invalid federal legislation establishing standards for
the labels (and contents) of "light beer" because it related to the regulation of business
in a single province; see Labatt Breweries of CanadaLtd. v. A.G. Can., [1980] 1 S.C.R.
914, 110 D.L.R. (3d) 594, 52 C.C.C. (2d) 433 (1979). The decision may be distinguished because it is premised on the assumption that the beer was sold in the province
of manufacture, see id. at 939 (S.C.R.), 622 (D.L.R.), 461 (C.C.C.) ("production and
local sale"), whereas Part 8 is limited to interprovincial businesses. Indeed, a decision
by a provincial commission concerning, for example, permissible limits on public ownership of registered securities firms necessarily affects the conduct and operations of such
firms throughout Canada regardless of their province of origin; see, e.g., supra notes
155, 170 and 171; but see Labatt Breweries at 940-42 (S.C.R.), 623-25 (D.L.R.), 462228
22

9 See
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Purpose and Process

Draft Act remains, therefore, "likely within Parliament's jurisdiction to enaet.,,=6
Nevertheless, as the results of constitutional adjudication cannot be predicted with certainty, the Draft Act contains a declaration that its provisions
and parts are severable so that a holding of invalidity with respect to one will
not affect the others.2 7 The severability provision may be more advisable now
than when the Proposalswere drafted in view of a series of recent Supreme
Court decisions that evince a provincial reorientation in judicial outlook reminiscent of the Haldane era.238 Although none of these decisions negates the
constitutional premises of the Proposals,29 they do increase the uncertainty
surrounding them. Clarification through a constitutional amendment, there24
fore, would be desirable. 0

In view of the forthcoming constitutional conference 41 this symposium
issue is to be welcomed, for the articles contained in it provide a perspective
on various aspects of the Proposals based on regulatory experience in the
United States with the most developed securities market in the world and the
one with which the Canadian market is most closely linked. They therefore
introduce a valuable international dimension 2 to the discussion of the substantive recommendations in the Proposals and will assume an appropriate
place in the decision-making process relating to the development of a national co-ordinated system of securities regulation in Canada.
64 (C.C.C.), excluding "the regulation of a single trade or industry" from Parliament's
jurisdiction over matters of general trade and commerce.
236 1 Proposals at ix. But see supra note 235; and see text accompanying notes 237,
infra.
237 See 1 Proposals, s. 16.17; 2 Proposals at 397-98. This provision will become
especially important if the Draft Act is enacted, for Part 12 would replace a number of
provisions in the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34; see supra note 208. These
provisions would remain valid as matters relating to criminal law.
238 See, e.g., Dominion Stores Ltd. v. R., supra note 230; Labatt Breweries of Canada Ltd. v. A.G. Can., supra note 235; Boggs v. R., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 49, 120 D.L.R.
(3d) 718 (prohibition against driving without a licence colourable invasion of provincial
jurisdiction); compare, e.g., In re Board of Commerce Act, 1919, [1922] 1 A.C. 191,
60 D.L.R. 513, [1922] 1 W.W.R. 20 (P.C. 1921).
239 Both Dominion Stores and Labatt Breweries were premised on the application
of the legislation in question to intraprovincial transactions; see supra notes 230 and
235; and see supra, text accompanying notes 232-34. The recent Supreme Court decision
upholding the application of provincial legislation to a hydro tower straddling the border
between Alberta and British Columbia, while consistent with the Court's new orientation,
see supra, text accompanying note 238, does not affect the jurisdictional premises of the
Proposals concerning stock exchanges because a major element of the decision was the
fact that no federal legislation existed to govern the interconnecting hydro lines; see
Fulton v. Energy Resources Conservation Bd., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 153 at 161-62, 118 D.L.R.
(3d) 577 at 588-89, [1981] 4 W.W.R. 236 at 250-51. In fact, the Chief Justice implies
that the decision might have been otherwise had there been applicable federal legislation;
id. at 162 (S.C.R.), 589 (D.L.R.), 251 (W.W.R.). See also Anisman and Hogg, supra
note 15, at 174-75.
240 See supra,text accompanying note 9.
241 See supra,text accompanying note 12.
242
See supra, text accompanying notes 164-74.

